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OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE IN LOUISIANA LAW:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS:
PART 11-ACCEPTANCE
Saftl Litvinoff*
COMMUNICATN OF THE ACCEPTANCE
The problem of the duration of the offer should not be
confused with the problem of whether the offer can be revoked
after the acceptance, but before the latter is received.1 This
second problem is related to the communication of the accep-
tance. It appears involved most frequently in cases of contracts
by correspondence,2 making the place of the formation of the
contract an interesting topic. Thus, a series of important issues
arise out of the problem of communication of the acceptance.
French Law
In French law, the acceptance is dealt with as a declaration
of will s and, therefore, when the law does not provide other-
wise, it is not subject to any formalities. 4 It can be conveyed
by the human voice, directly or by telephone, or recorded by
any means of mechanical reproduction; it can be written or
printed, signed or unsigned. It can also be conveyed by all kinds
of signs, acts, gestures, or attitudes susceptible of making the
assent known in an unequivocal manner,5 or implying it by
necessity. It is asserted that the judicial recognition given to the
acceptance in any particular case will always involve a question
of fact.6
* Of the faculty of the Louisiana State University Law School.
1. See Part I, 28 LA. L. REV. 1, 21, 61 (1967).
2. Id.
3. 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRArTa PATIQUE DE DRorr CIVIL FRANgAIS--OBLIGA-
TIONS-PART I 111, 158 (2d ed. Esmein 1952). Although a declaration of will
actually constituting a juridical act, 2 DEMOGUE, TRAIT9 DES OBLIGATIONS EN
GtNtRAL 172 (1923).
4. 6 PLANIOL & RIPnRT, TRAITf PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANIAIS--OBLIGA-
TIONS-PART I 158 (2d ed. Esmeln 1952).
5. Id. at 111. See Req. May 7, 1935, GAZ. PAL., 1935, 2, 58: "The contract
of transportation by tramway is perfected the moment the passenger takes
a place in the car." Trib. Seine, Dec. 26, 1913, GAZ. TRI., 1914, 1, 2, 99: "The
act of a magazine director whereby he sends the galleys of an article
to the writer from whom he received the manuscript, implies the acceptance
of the article." See also LA. CIVIL CODS art. 1816 (1870).
6. 2 DEMOoUS, TRAIT8 DES OBLIGATIONS EN G2NX RAL 150 (1923); 6 PLANIOL &
RIPERT, TRAITf: PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRAN9AIS--OBLTGATIONS-PART I 158
(2d ed. Esmein 1952); Req. June 16, 1913, D. 1914, 1.229; Req., Feb. 20, 1905,
S. 1905, 1, 508; Cass. Civ. March 30, 1881, S. 1882, 1, 56, D. 1881, I, 359.
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The acceptance should conform to the offer. If any condition
is introduced by the acceptor not formulated in the offer, the
acceptance is considered a counter-proposition. 7 French law
classifies this as a question of fact.8 It has also been decided
that conventional usages and the constant need for good faith
to prevail in transactions may impose the necessity of disregard-
ing express reservations formulated at the time of concluding
a contract.9
The principle that a declaration of will addressed to a
particular person does not become effective until received by
him is well recognized in French law.10 However, it is subject
to the following modifications:
(a) If, according to the intention of the parties, it is not
necessary to the formation of a contract that the acceptance
be made known to the offeror, then the contract is perfected by
the acceptor's assent, even when tacit or implied.
(b) If, according to the intention of the parties, an express
acceptance is necessary, the contract will not be perfected until
the communication of the acceptance reaches the offeror.1 '
Thus, in French law, the acceptance does not necessarily
depend on its reception by the offeror. In all cases where the
acceptance can be tacit, it is effective without communication to
the offeror.1 2
In this connection, a very careful distinction is made in
French law between contracts in which the parties are in the
presence of each other and contracts in which the parties are
7. 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAIT2 PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS-PART I
158 (2d ed. Esmein 1952). See LA. CiVIL CODE art. 1805 (1870).
8. 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAIT1% PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL F RANgAIS-OBLIGA-
TIONS-PART I 158 (2d ed. Esmein 1952).
9. See Req. Dec. 29, 1924, GAZ. PAL., 1925, 1, 522; 6 PLANiOL & RiPERT,
TRAITA PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS-OBLIGATIONS-PART I 159 (2d ed.
Esmein 1952).
10. 2 DEMoGUE, TRArrt DES OBLIGATIONS EN GANtRAL 171 (1923); 6 PLANIOL &
RIPERT, TRAITb DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS-OBLIGATIONS-PART I 159 (2d ed. Esmein
1952). In 1 AUBRY & RAU, COURS Do DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS-OBLIGATIONS (AN
ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) 808 (1965), a
different rule is apparently formulated, but the subject therein discussed is
a contract by correspondence, and contracts of this kind should be con-
sidered an exception to the general principle.
11. 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAITI PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS-OBLIGA-
TIONS-PART 1 159 (2d ed. Esmein 1952).
12. 2 DEMOGUE, TRAIT2 DES OBLIGATIONS EN G9NARAL 172 (1923).
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at a distance.13 The formation of contracts involving two or
more parties is rather simple, when they are face to face, or
in a position that enables them to communicate their thoughts
instantly, such as telephoning. If one of the parties is acting
through an agent the situation does not vary. The contract is
formed at the moment the parties, or their representatives,
express their consent to the essential conditions.14 If the parties
are dealing face to face, it is generally agreed that the accord
of their wills must take place immediately; the offer will not
remain open if not accepted in the course of the parties' face
to face negotiation. 5 A distinction is made when the parties
agree to meet another time or when one of them has requested
a time for reflection.'8
But the formation of a contract is considerably less simple
when it takes place between parties who must communicate
through messenger, letters, telegrams, or any other means.
There has been discussion in French doctrine concerning
the category under which a contract negotiated by telephone
should be classified. It has been said that this question is not
properly formulated, for the important thing to consider is
whether the contract, or the exchange of communications, is
one requiring a certain delay for its perfection.17 When the
parties are face to face, no delay is required; when the parties
are at a distance, a certain delay is necessary. It seems clear
that contracts by telephone fall in the same category as those
in which the parties are in the presence of each other, since no
delay is required for the exchange of communications. 8 Con-
tracts by letter, telegram, or messenger fall in the category of
contracts where a certain delay is required.19
However, this assimilation between contracts by telephone
and contracts in which the parties are present should not exclude
the real distance that separates the parties communicating
through the telephone. This distance gives rise to the same
13. Id. at 149 et seq. This terminology is preferable to "contracts be-
tween absent parties," see, e.g., 3 Pure PERA, COMPENDIO DE DERECHO CIVM
ESPAf OL, PART I 461 (1966).
14. 2 DEmooUE, TRAITt DES OBLIGATIONS EN GnNtRAL 150 (1923).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Cass., May 14, 1912, D. 1913, I. 281. See also 6 PLANOL & RIPERT, TRArrt
PRATIQUE DE DROrr CiVIL FRANAIS--OBLIOATIONS-PART I 156 (2d ed. Esmein
1952).
19. 2 DEMo0UE, TRAIn' DES OBLIGATIONS EN GtNRRAL 150 (1923).
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problems as those relating to contracts by correspondence, partic-
ularly in regard to the place of formation of the contract.
French courts have decided that the one who places the tele-
phone call is considered as having gone to the other party's
place to engage in negotiations, and that is where the contract
is deemed to have been formed. 20
In sum, it can be said that in French law the general prin-
ciple is that the acceptance must be communicated to the
proposer for the contract to be perfected. This general principle
is, however, flexible, and admits the following exceptions:
(a) When it is clear that the intention of the parties was
to agree otherwise, the court will honor the intention.
(b) When the intention of the parties is not clear, the court
will carefully examine the situation to ascertain whether the
contract required a delay for its perfection.
(c) When the contract is such that a certain delay for its
definitive formation is necessary, as when the parties are at a
distance, it may be considered perfected the moment the accep-
tance is transmitted by the offeree.2' This becomes especially
relevant:
(1) In contracts by correspondence,
(2) In offers made to the public, and
(3) In the case in which the place of formation will deter-
mine the law applicable.'
German Law
In German law a traditional distinction is made between
declarations of will that must be received by the addressee in
order to produce valid effects (empfangsbediirftig) and those
which do not depend on their reception. 28 The acceptance is
uniformly classified as empfangsbediirftig, and, therefore, does
not produce any effects until its reception by the offeror.2 4
20. Trib. Comm. Angers, Sept. 23, 1904, GAZ. TRIS., 1905, 1, 2, 223.
21. 1 AUBRY & RAU, COURS DE DRorr CivIL FRANQAIS-OBLIGATIONS (AN
ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) 308-309 (1965);
2 COLIN ET CAPITANT, COURS ELUMENTAtRE DE DROIT CIViL FRANQAIS 38 (10th ed.
1953).
22. 2 COLIN ET CAPITANT, COURS ELUMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgkiS 37
(10th ed. 1953).
23. See Part I, 28 LA. L. REV. 1 n.168.
24. 1 ENNECCERUS-NIPPERDEY, ALLGEMEINER TEiL, LEHRBUCH DES BURGER-
LICHEN RECHTS, PART II 682 (1955); SALEILLES, ETUDE SUR LA TH2ORIE GtN9RALE
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A distinction between declarations of will made to a person
who is present and those addressed to a person who is at a
distance is also familiar in German law and leads to a clear-
cut differentiation. The German Civil Code regulates only situa-
tions of the second kind: declarations of will addressed to an
absent person.25
In ancient German law this topic was already the subject
of discussion, and the rule prevailed that a contract was not
perfected until the acceptance reached the offeror. This was
the solution adopted by the ancient German Code of Commerce,
in Articles 320 and 321, but with the difference that the act of
reception was granted retroactive effects. 2e Therefore, by the
operation of this peculiar rule, the contract was not perfected
until the reception of the acceptance, but upon perfection, the
contract was considered as retroactively concluded at the moment
the acceptance had been emitted.
The same rule was adopted by the German Civil Code, but
without the artificial retroactive effects. As the modern German
Commercial Code does not contain provisions regulating the
moment of contract formation, the basic rules in the Civil Code
are applicable to commercial matters.2T According to German
law, the acceptance that reaches the offeror is deprived of valid
effects when a revocation was previously or simultaneously
received.28
A certain degree of flexibility, however, has been introduced
by considering that "reception" does not mean an act whereby
the offerer takes physical possession of the document containing
the acceptance, but an act that places such a document at the
offeror's disposal and availability.29 If the offeror refuses to
DE LOBLIGATION 142-43 (3d ed. 1925); SCHUSTER, THU PwNcnLzs OF GzRMAN
CIVIL LAW 97-98 (1907).
25. B.G.B. § 130.
26. Accord, 1 ENNECCERUS-NIPPERDzY, AILOEMINU TEIL, LUHRBUCH DUB
BURGERLICHEN RECHTS, PART II 666 (1955).
27. Id.
28. B.G.B. § 130: "A declaration of will addressed to another, when the
latter is not present, shall become effective at the moment it reaches him.
It shall not become effective, if previously or simultaneously, the revoca-
tion reaches the addressee. The effects of the declaration of will are not
affected by the subsequent death or incapacity of the one who makes it.
These provisions are also applicable when the declaration of will is addressed
to a public authority." Accord, 91 R.G.Z. 63 (1918); 60 R.G.Z. 337 (1905).
29. CI. 99 R.G.Z. 23 (1920) (declaration of will received when the letter
that contains it is placed in the addressee's mail box at his disposal);
60 R.G.Z. 336 (1905); 56 R.G.Z. 263 (1904); 50 R.G.Z. 194 (1902) (the same
when the letter is delivered to relatives, or members of the household in
19681
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accept delivery, reception is implied, and the contract per-
fected.80
In contracts entered into when the parties are present, the
same rules are applied by analogy. If the acceptance is in writing,
the contract will be formed the moment the instrument is deliv-
ered to the offeror. If the acceptance is verbal, the formation
occurs when the declaration is understood by the addressee,
and not when the spoken words reach his ears.3'
However, by virtue of the principle of freedom of contract
accepted by the German Civil Code,82 the parties are free to
stipulate otherwise. Thus, it is understood that the offeror may
subject the future acceptance to certain conditions. He can
introduce more stringent requirements, such as the condition
that the acceptance is to be delivered to him, in person. He
also can alleviate the legal requirements, stipulating, for instance,
that the posting of a letter, or even a mere signal, will suffice
as an indication of acceptance of his proposition. 3 The German
Civil Code has taken into account two different situations of
this kind: the first, when the offeror has waived the express
declaration of acceptance; the second, when according to con-
ventional usages a declaration of acceptance is not to be
expected.84 In such cases, the contract will be perfected without
the offeror receiving or knowing of the acceptance.
In conclusion, it can be said that in German law:
(a) The rule that makes the acceptance effective upon its
reception by the offeror is very firmly established, and does
the addressee's residence. But not if the letter is concealed in a parcel
in such a manner that the addressee could not have taken cognizance of
it immediately). See 1 ENNCCERus-NPPERDEY, ALLGEMEINER TEIL, LEHRBUCH
DES BURGORLICHEN REcHTS, PART II 668 (1955).
30. Accord, 110 R.G.Z. 36 (1925); 1 EN4ECCERUS-NIPPERDEY, ALLGEMEINER
TILL, LEHRBUCH DES BURGERLICHEN RECHTS, PART II 669 (1955).
31. 1 ENNECCERUS-NIPPERDEY, ALLGEMEINER TEL, LEHRBUCH DES BURGER-
LICHEN RECHTS, PART II 671 (1955).
32. ENNECCERUS-LEHMANN, SCHULDRECHT, LEHRBUCH DES BURGERLICHEN
RECHTS 118-19 (1959).
33. 1 ENNECCERUS-NIPPERDEY, ALLOEMEINER TElL, LEHRBUCH DES BURGER-
LICHEN RECHTS, PART II 683 (1955).
34. B.G.B. § 151: "A contract is concluded by the acceptance of the
offer, although the acceptance is not communicated to the proposer, when
such a communication is not to be expected according to ordinary usage,
or when the offeror has waived it. The moment at which the offer ceases
to be binding Is determined according to the Intention of the proposer,
which shall be inferred from the offer itself, or from the circumstances."
Of. 124 R.G.Z. 336 (1929); 105 R.G.Z. 16 (1923); 102 R.G.Z. 371 (1921); 90
R.G.Z. 435 (1917); 84 R.G. 323 (1914).
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not recognize exceptions other than those expressly enumerated
in the Civil Code in accordance with the parties' freedom to
contract.
(b) The distinction between contracts the parties to which
are present and contracts the parties to which are at a distance
does not lead to the conclusion that the former do not require
a delay for perfection, and the latter do require such a delay,
as in French law. Such a conclusion is unnecessary in German
law, as the German Civil Code, unlike the French Civil Code,
contains a detailed regulation of this matter.3 5
Common Law
At common law, the approach to this problem varies, and
the existence of a definite rule has been questioned.36 Only once
was it asserted that notice of acceptance is necessary as a rule
except when the offeror has clearly indicated otherwise, and
that "notice," in this context, should mean knowledge reaching
the offeror8 7 But the reasons underlying this rule have been
strongly criticized as a "begging of the question" in order to
prove a desired conclusion.88 Moreover, it has been asserted by
unquestionable authority that such a requirement is to be found
only in certain types of cases. 9 The following distinctions should
be made in order to arrive at the proper solution for each
situation:
(a) The offeror can require notice of acceptance in any
form he pleases. Thus, he may require the acceptance to be
transmitted in any manner, and in any language, and that there
shall be no contract "unless and until he is himself made con-
scious of it. '40
(b) The offeror can prescribe a certain form of making the
35. See supra notes 28 and 29.
36. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 67, at 108-09 (1952); GaISMos, CONTRACTS §§ 45-47
(Murray 1965).
37. Household Fire & Cas. Acc. Ins. Co. v. Grant, 4 Ex. D. 216, 233
(1879): "It is necessary, as a rule, to constitute the contract that there
should be a communication of acceptance to the proposer. As a con-
sequence of or involved in the first proposition, if the acceptance is written
or verbal-i.e., is by letter or message, as a rule, it must reach the proposer
or there is no communication so no acceptance of the offer." (Opinion by
Bramwell, J., but a majority of the court disagreed.)
38. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 67, at 109 (1952).
39. Id.
40. Lewis v. Browning, 130 Mass. 173 (1881). See CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 67,
at 109 (1952).
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acceptance of his offer without implying that the specified method
is exclusive of all others. If the prescribed form is one that
will not bring to the offeror the knowledge that his offer has
been accepted, then such knowledge is not a requirement.
(c) If the offeror does not specify a form of acceptance,
there is no requirement other than that the form adopted shall
conform to usage and custom of men in similar cases. 41
(d) If the offer does not indicate in an express manner
that notice of acceptance is necessary where the offer calls for
the making of a promise in return, notice is usually required.
The basis for this is that the element of communication is in-
volved in the essence of a promise, and, as a promise is a com-
municated undertaking, the offeree cannot be said to have made
a promise unless and until he communicates his undertaking to
the offeror. In this kind of situation, therefore, the rule would
be as follows: "In bilateral contracts, notice of acceptance is
usually required; in unilateral contracts, notice is usually not
required."4 2
Another attempt to generalize a solution for situations of
the kind described in (c) and (d) is expressed in the following
language: "The most reasonable rule . . .seems to be that if
the offer is of such kind that the offeror needs to know of the
acceptance in order to determine his subsequent action, and
the offeree has reason to know this, a notice of acceptance
must be given. If the offeree is asked to make a promise, it is
not enough for him to express assent secretly, or to tell his
wife or his neighbor that he accepts, or to take the train
expecting to go to the offeror's place of business, or to begin
work in preparation to perform that which he is asked to
promise to perform. One who asks for a promise is asking for
an expressed assurance for the purpose of guiding his future
conduct." 43
It follows that, when notice of acceptance is a requirement,
41. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 78 (1952).
42. GRiSMORm, CONTRACTS § 45, at 64 (Murray 1965). In the rare case
where the offeror in a unilateral contract is requesting a promise and
not an act, notice of acceptance should be required as in the case of a
bilateral contract; see, for instance, White v. Corlies, 46 N.Y. 467 (1871),
although not a very convincing example. See also RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
§ 57 (1932): "If in an offer of a unilateral contract the proposed act or
forbearance is that of the offeror, the contract is not complete until the
offeree makes the promise requested."
43. CORSIN, CONTRACTS § 67, at 110 (1952).
[Vol. XXVIII
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it is for the offeror's benefit, and, therefore, there is no reason
why he cannot be allowed to dispense with it. As a consequence,
when the offeror has expressed his intention to be bound with-
out any communication of the acceptance made to him by the
offeree, the law will give support to his intention. This will
always involve a problem of interpreting the offer.44
It also follows that, when the offer calls for an act or
forbearance as the return for a promise, the performance of
the requested act or forbearance amounts to the offeree's mani-
festation of acceptance. It has been said the basis of this rule
is that the offeror is usually aware that the requested act or
forbearance has been performed. But a very special problem
arises when the offeree knows, or should reasonably know, that
the act of performance will not reach the offeror's knowledge.
In this case, the most general opinion asserts the rule that notice
of acceptance is still not required, when the offeror has requested
an act in absence of the offeror's expressed intention that notice
shall be given.45
44. Cf. GRISMORIM, CONTRACTS § 46, at 64 (Murray 1965): "Thus, where
an offer for a bilateral contract stated that a contract should come into
being where the offer was approved by an executive officer of the offeree at
its home office, it was held that a contract was consummated the moment
the specified approval was given, and without any communication of the
undertaking or assent to the offeror." See International Filter Co. v. Conroe
Gin, Ice & Light Co., 277 S.W. 631 (Tex. 1925); Van Arsdale-Osborne Broker-
age Co. v. Robertson, 36 Okla. 123, 128 Pac. 107 (1912), and compare with
Ever-Tite Roofing Corp. v. Green, 83 So.2d 449 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1955), dis-
cussed Part I, 28 LA. L. REv. 1, 47-49 (1967).
45. Midland Nat'l Bank v. Security Elevator Co., 161 Minn. 30, 200 N.W.
851 (1924); City Nat'l Bank v. Phelps, 86 N.Y. 484 (1881). But, other cases
indicate that notice Is required In such a situation and, moreover, that no
contract is concluded unless the assent is communicated: Kresge Dept.
Stores v. Young, 37 A.2d 448 (D.C. Cir. 1944); Davis v. Wells Fargo & Co.,
104 U.S. 159 (1881). Finally, an Intermediate solution was formulated in
Bishop v. Eaton, 161 Mass. 496, 499, 37 N.E. 665, 667 (1894): "Ordinarily,
there is no occasion to notify the offeror of the acceptance of such an
offer, for the doing of the act is a sufficient acceptance, and the promisor
knows that he is bound when he sees that action has been taken on the
faith of his offer. But if the act is of such a kind that knowledge of it
will not quickly come to the promisor, the promisee is bound to give him
notice of his acceptance within a reasonable time after doing that which
constitutes the acceptance. In such a case it is Implied in the offer that, to
complete the contract, notice shall be given with due diligence, so that
the promisor may know that a contract has been made. But where the
promise is in consideration of an act to be done, it becomes binding upon
the doing of the act so far that the promisee cannot be affected by a sub-
sequent withdrawal of it, if, within a reasonable time afterwards, he notifies
the promisor." In other words, in this third approach, notice of the
acceptance by performance of an act is required, but it does not need to
reach the offeror's knowledge for the promise to be binding. This solution
seems to avoid the harshness placed upon the offeror by the first line of
cases, and prevent the harshness that could derive for the offeree according
to the second line of cases. This intermediate solution seems to have been
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It is relevant that the Restatement of the Law of Contracts,
Section 65, recognizes important differences among the situations
of the parties, as in German and French law discussed above.
A distinction is implied in the treatment given to the acceptance
by telephone: "Acceptance given by telephone is governed by
the principles applicable to oral acceptances where the parties
are in the presence of each other." By clear implication then,
immediacy of the acceptance, and knowledge of it by the
offeror, are required where the parties are negotiating at arm's
length or by telephone.
In general terms, the principles previously discussed have
found their place in the Restatement. Although there is no
specific rule for the case of bilateral contracts, Section 61 pro-
vides: "If an offer prescribes the place, time or manner of
acceptance its terms in this respect must be complied with in
order to create a contract. If an offer merely suggests a per-
mitted place, time or manner of acceptance, another method
of acceptance is not precluded." It follows that, if nothing is
said in the offer about the acceptance, then usage and custom
will determine whether the communication of the acceptance is
necessary.
Speaking of unilateral contracts, Section 56 states: "Where
forbearance or an act other than a promise is the consideration
for a promise, no notification that the act or forbearance has
been given is necessary to complete the contract. But if the
offeror has no adequate means of ascertaining with reasonable
promptness and certainty that the act or forbearance has been
given, and the offeree should know this, the contract is dis-
charged unless within a reasonable time after performance of
the act or forbearance, the offeree exercises reasonable diligence
to notify the offeror thereof. '4 6
Instead of formulating a rule subject to exceptions, as in
civil law, the preferred approach at common law is to formulate
adopted in RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 56 (1932). Accord, GRiSMORE, CONTRACTS
§ 47, at 66 (Murray ed. 1965). In this type of solution, the giving of notice
actually becomes part of the offeree's performance.
46. Emphasis added. It should be remembered: "In the formation of
a unilateral contract where the offeror is the party making the promise,
as is almost invariably the case, a compliance with the request in the offer
fulfills the double function of a manifestation of acceptance and of giving
consideration." RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 56, Comment a (1932). The
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS has abandoned unilateral and bilateral
contracts as preferred terminology. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS
(Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965), especially at § 105.
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different rules for different situations. At first impression, it
can be said that the common law approach is more realistic.
However, since communication is woven into the essence of the
act of acceptance it is very difficult to disregard. Exceptions to
general principles always call for a more careful determination
by the courts. Assuming that the situation envisaged in Section
56 of the Restatement of Law of Contracts could be solved in
the light of Articles 1816 and 1818 of the Louisiana Civil Code,
the latter, in many cases, would lead to fairer decisions, as the
exceptional situation is not regulated in general terms.
Louisiana Law
In Louisiana, the answer to whether the acceptance requires
communication to the offeror should be sought in Articles 1809
and 1819 of the Civil Code. These articles are quoted here for
clarity:
"Article 1809: The obligation of a contract not being com-
plete, until the acceptance, or in cases where it is implied
by law, until the circumstances, which raise such implica-
tion, are known to the party proposing; he may therefore
revoke his offer or proposition before such acceptance, but
not without allowing such reasonable time as from the
terms of his offer he has given, or from the circumstances
of the case he may be supposed to have intended to give
the party, to communicate his determination.'49
"Article 1819: Consent being the concurrence of intention
in two or more persons, with regard to a matter understood
by all, reciprocally communicated, and resulting in each
party from a free and deliberate exercise of the will, it
follows that there is no consent, not only where the intent
has not been mutually communicated or implied, as is pro-
provided in the preceding paragraph, but also where it has
been produced by -
"Error;
"Fraud,
"Violence;
"Threats."50
49. Emphasis added.
50. Emphasis added.
1968]
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Exceptions
The words italicized indicate very clearly that the accep-
tance is supposed to be known by the offeror, as the consent
is to be reciprocally communicated. However, one exception is
admitted in Article 1819, since in its clear language, consent
may be "communicated or implied." If implied, there is no
necessity of communication, which interpretation is perfectly
consistent with Articles 1816, 1817 and 1818.
But this is not the only exception contemplated by the Lou-
isiana Civil Code. Another, and very important one, is envisaged
in Article 1810:
".. . But if the contract be accepted before the death of
the party offering it, although he had no notice of it, the
obligation is complete; but if the representatives assent to
an acceptance of the surviving party in the first instance,
or the survivor assent to an acceptance made by the repre-
sentatives in the second instance, then it becomes a new
contract between the representatives and the surviving
party."51
This means that if the proposer dies in the period between
acceptance and reception of its communication, as an exception
to the general rule, the acceptance, although not communicated,
will be valid.
Mandate
Another exception flows very directly from Article 2988,
dealing with the contract of mandate: "The contract of mandate
is completed only by the acceptance of the mandatory. '52 No
reference is made to communication of the acceptance. In the
light of Article 2989, the acceptance, in such a case, may be
express or tacit. If there is room for doubt, Article 2990 adds a
final degree of clarity:
"If the proxy or attorney in fact pleads that he has not
accepted or acted under the power, it is incumbent on the
principal to prove he has."
51. Emphasis added. See Part I, 28 LA. L. REV. 1, 64 (1967).
52. The word only, in this article, lends itself to some degree of am-
biguity. The French text of this article reads: "Le contrat n'est consommd
que par 1'acceptaton du mandataire." La. Civil Code art. 2957 (1825). Art.
1984 of the FRENCH CIVIL CODE reads: . . . Le contrat no se forme que par
l'aoceptation du mandataire."
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It is not very difficult to imagine that, in the kind of situa-
tion envisaged in this article, the attorney will allege, perhaps
as his principal defense, the lack of communication of the
acceptance as the best proof that he did not accept, and, there-
fore, is not bound. However, the principal may prove that the
attorney accepted, even where no communication was attempted.
It is necessary to conclude, therefore, that the communication
of the acceptance is not a requirement in matters of mandate.
Donations Inter Vivos
Another special situation is the one contemplated in Article
1540 of the Louisiana Civil Code. It is not, certainly, an excep-
tion in the sense that Articles 1810 and 2988 form exceptions to
Articles 1809 and 1819. On the contrary, Article 1540 is an
exception only in the sense that it is a case where the general
rule does not admit any exceptions. This article reads:
"A donation inter vivos shall be binding on the donor, and
shall produce effect only from the day of its being accepted
in precise terms. The acceptance may be made during the
lifetime of the donor by a posterior and authentic act, but
in that case the donation shall have effect, with regard to
the donor, only from the day of his being notified of the
act establishing that acceptance."
According to this article, the general rule requiring that the
acceptance be communicated applies in such a strict manner that
no exception, as the one contemplated in Article 1810, could
be admitted. Therefore, if the donor dies before the acceptance
was communicated to him, the donation would be invalid. 3
Regular and Exceptional Situations
The preceding discussion shows that the Louisiana law,
in this matter, admits a general rule subject to exceptions, in a
manner consistent with the civil law approach. It should not
be thought that the only exceptions are those expressly con-
53. Accord, 2 COLIN ET CAPITANT, COURS EL]AMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL FRAN-
gAIS 35-36 (10th ed. 1953); 3 TOULLIER, LE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS SUIVANT L'ORDR8
DU CODE 79, 85 (1833). See also Lawrence v. Police Jury, 35 La. Ann. 601
(1883); Fuselier v. Masse, 4 La. 423 (1832). By the Spanish law, donations
mortis causa did not require acceptance; and in donations inter vivos, It
was only requisite to deprive the donor of the power of revocation, where
delivery did not follow the gift. See 3 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE, PART II
(AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) nos.
2525-2533 (1959).
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templated in the test of the Civil Code. On the contrary, the
importance attributed by the Code to the situation of the parties
and the nature of the contract in related matters, such as the
expression of dissent and duration of the offer,5 4 should com-
mand the conclusion that the same circumstances are to be
taken into account in order to ascertain when and where an
exception to the general rule requiring communication should
be admitted. This conclusion becomes more imperative when
it is realized that general precepts, as those in the Civil Code
of Louisiana, its model, and its contemporaries, are mostly
based on what is considered more common or current. In
matters of contracts, the presence of both parties during nego-
tiation and conclusion seem to be the commonest occurrence;
but it should not follow that the requirements established for
regular and current situations are also to be observed in cases
where the circumstances are less common, or irregular.56 As
a matter of tradition, contracts the parties to which are not
In the presence of each other have been considered uncommon.
This consideration should obviously be changed in view of
modern ways of life and communication; but as long as tradi-
tional texts remain as they were written, their correct inter-
pretation will require determination of the situations contem-
plated by the redactors as common, or unusual. Otherwise, the
law would be deprived of flexibility, at the risk of making
logical consistency prevail over real necessity. 7
Offers of Guaranty
The necessity of communicating the acceptance has been
especially discussed in Louisiana jurisprudence in reference to
the area of offers of a guaranty. 5 As in other contracts, the
54. See Part I, 28 LA. L. REv. 1, 38 (1967).
55. Accord, Nussbaum, The Offer and Acceptance Doctrine, 36 CoLUM.
L. REv. 923 (1936).
56. Accord, 2 PuoG BRUTAU, FUNDAMENTOS DE DERECHO CIVIL, PART I 223-24
(1954).
57. Id. For cases in which notice of acceptance has been discussed in
Louisiana jurisprudence, see, e.g., Hanemann v. Uhry, 8 La. App. 534 (Orl.
Cir. 1928).
58. The courts of Louisiana have been trying, without success, to
determine whether guaranty and surety are the same. Though in theory
they treat of different concepts, there is very little practical value in
differentiating between them. Considering them to be the same have been:
Brock v. First State Bank & Trust Co., 187 La. 766, 175 So. 569 (1937)
("a contract of guaranty in this state is equivalent to a contract of surety");
Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Mickelberry, 189 La. 106, 179 So. 49 (1936);
Lachman v. Block, 47 La. Ann. 505, 15 So. 649 (1894); Graves v. Scott &
Baer, 23 La. Ann. 690 (1871). A case which adopts somewhat of a middle
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general rule is that the acceptance of such an offer must be
communicated to the offeror.59 However, if the offer of guaranty
is limited to a presently existing debt or to a specific future
debt, there are three situations in which the acceptance need
not be communicated: (1) The circumstances of the case prove
that there was an express mutual assent by the parties at the
time of the offer.60 (2) The relation of the parties proves that
the offeror must have known that his offer would be relied
ground on this issue is First Nat'l Bank of Arcadia v. White, 127 So.
433 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1930). Firmly adopting the negative point of view
have been: Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Barthet, 177 La. 652, 148 So. 906(1933); Louisiana & N.R.R. v. Dillard, 51 La. Ann. 1484, 26 So. 451 (1899)
(in which the decision turned on the distinction); Gale v. Thompson, 3 Rob.
334 (La. 1842); Gasquet v. Thorn, 14 La. 506 (1840). The offer of guaranty
may be treated as any other, and its form is relevant only as to methods of
acceptance and the nature of the guaranty. See Interstate Trust & Banking
Co. v. Sabatier, 189 La. 199, 179 So. 80 (1938). As in any other offer, its
terms and the circumstances of the case may lead to the conclusion that
it is irrevocable during a certain period of time.
An interesting situation occurs when there is more than one party
signing as guarantor. Each party can revoke his offer until it is signed
by all of the other parties, or if some of the intended parties do not sign.
This is based to some extent upon a theory of mutuality. Curtiss v. Moss,:
2 Rob. 367 (La. 1824); Wells v. Dills, 1 Mart.(N.S.) 592 (La. 1823). This was
immediately amended to include the proviso that, even if some of the
intended guarantors do not sign, the offer of guaranty cannot be revoked
when it has been relied upon. Canal & Banking Co. v. Brown, 4 La. Ann.
545 (1849). In this case, the court spoke in terms of surety rather than
guaranty. Distinctions between a limited guaranty and a continuing guaranty
are made in order to determine the period during which the offeree may
accept. See, e.g., Interstate Trust & Banking Co. v. Sabatier, 189 La. 199,
179 So. 80 (1938); Hibernia Bank & Trust Co. v. Succession of Cancienne,
140 La. 969, 74 So. 267 (1924); Lachman v. Block, 47 La. Ann. 505, 15 So. 649
(1894); Menard & Vigneaud v. J. B. Scudder & Nolen Seewart, 7 La. Ann.
385, 56 Am. Dec. 610 (1852). For a discussion of the requirements of the
acceptance of an offer of guaranty, see Vordenbaumen *v. Gray, 189 So. 342
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1939), in which the offeree's conditional acceptance was
treated as a counteroffer which was subject to acceptance by the original
offeror. In Cottam & Co. v. Gonzales, 5 La. App. 171 (lst Cir. 1926), the
offeror had requested "prompt notice." He did not got it, and the court
concluded that his offer was not accepted. At common law, this problem
of notice of acceptance of the offer of guaranty has been particularly
troublesome. See, e.g., Kresge Dept. Stores v. Young, 37 A.2d 448 (D.C. Mun.
App. 1944); Midland Nat. Bank v. Security Elevator Co., 161 Minn. 30, 200
N.W. 851 (1924), in which the view supported is that no notice is required;
Bishop v. Eaton, 161 Mass. 496, 37 N.E. 665 (1894).
59. See generally Siben v. Green, 8 So.2d 706 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1942);
Texas Co. v. Hudson, 155 La. 966, 99 So. 714 (1924); Davis Sewing Machine
Co. of Delaware v. Richards, 145 U.S. 524 (1885).
60. Commercial National Bank v. Richardson, 163 La. 933, 940, 113 So.
152, 154 (1927): "If the Guaranty is signed by the guarantor at the request
of the guarantee, or if the guarantor's agreement to accept is contem-
poraneous with the guaranty . . . the mutual assent is proved and the
delivery to him for his use completes the contract without further accep-
tance." Interstate Trust & Banking Co. v. Sabatier, 189 La. 199, 179 So. 80
(1937); Hibernia Bank & Trust Co. v. Succession of Cancienne, 140 La. 969,
74 So. 267 (1917).
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upon.6 ' (3) The terms of the offer evidence that no communica-
tion is required.62 If the offer is of a prospective and continuing
guaranty, notification of acceptance must be given63 unless from
the terms of the offer 4 or the situation of the parties, waiver
can be implied.65
TiM= AND PLACE OF CONTRACT FORMATION
Assuming that the offer and the acceptance take place at
two different moments, when and where is the contract formed?
These are questions of great interest not only because of their
unavoidable relation to the problem of revocability, but also
because they appear in matters of transfer of title,66 the prob-
lem of risk,67 the starting point of liberative prescription, and
the annulability of certain acts in the case of bankruptcy.6s
The when and where of contract formation are really two
questions, although generally treated as a single problem covered
by the same theory. However, the reasons for the importance of
each of them may differ. This may explain apparent inconsis-
tencies in the French jurisprudence, and calls for alert aware-
ness of the ultimate problems keyed to these questions which
are present, mainly, in the case of contracts by correspondence.
The two questions will be now discussed separately.
61. Times Picayune Pub. Co. v. Badon, 17 La. App. 114, 135 So. 631 (Orl.
Cir. 1931); Hibernia Bank & Trust Co. v. Succession of Cancienne, 140 La.
969, 74 So. 267 (1917).
62. Peoples Bank of New Orleans v. Lemarie, 106 La. 429, 31 So. 138
(1901).
63. Menard & Vigneaud v. J. B. Scudder & Nolan Seewart, 7 La. Ann.
385, 386, 56 Am. Dec. 610 (1852): "In the case of a prospective and continuing
guaranty, the creditor must not only show that he advanced his money,
or parted with his goods, on the faith of the letter of guaranty, but that
he accepted the guaranty, and intended to act upon its security. But
express and formal notice, emanating directly from the creditor or to the
guarantor, is not indispensable. If the fact of acceptance is seasonably
brought to the knowledge of the signer in any other way, and he acquiesces
by silence, it is sufficient."
64. Peoples Bank of New Orleans v. Lemarie, 106 La. 429, 31 So. 138,
(1901).
65. Hibernia Bank & Trust Co. v. Succession of Cancienne, 140 La.
969, 74 So. 267 (1917).
66. CODE NAPOLEON arts. 1138 and 1583, equivalent to LA. CIVIL CODE arts.
1908, 1909, and 2456 (1870). See 2 Dmooun, TRArI1 DES OBLIGATIONS EN GANIORAL
215 (1923).
67. CODE NAPOLEON art. 1138. See 2 DEMOGUE, TRAITt DES OBLIGATIONS EN
GANARAL 215 (1923).
68. FRENCH COMMERCIAL CODE arts. 446 and 447 (1807). See 2 DEMOoUE,
TRAMrh DES OsuaAoNs EN G9ANAAL 215 (1923).
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TIME OF CONTRACT FORMATION
Contracts by correspondence are but one example of con-
tracts between distant parties, or contracts in absentia, according
to a traditional terminology.69 Where the distant parties have
selected to communicate through the mail the first problem
involved is to ascertain the moment at which the contract shall
be regarded as concluded.
French Law
In French law, several theories have been advanced to deter-
mine the moment of formation. Two of these theories contend
that the contract is formed before the arrival of the letter of
acceptance. Two other theories, on the contrary, assert that
the contract is formed only when that letter arrives at its
destination.
The first one, the declaration theory,70 in its most orthodox
version, sees the contract formed at the moment the internal
will of the acceptor is generated in his mind. But all agree that
this orthodox conception must be tempered and that the moment
of the expression of the will should be substituted for the
moment of the mere generation of the will, as the real instant
of contract formation. Thus, it has been said that the writing
of a letter suffices as expression of will. The subsequent process
of addressing and mailing it, which is something that regularly
takes place according to usage, or even habit, is not of the
essence of the declaration of will.71
The second theory, that of transmission,7 2 considers the con-
tract formed at the moment the acceptor parts with the letter
containing the acceptance. It is said that, until then, his will
69. Such as contracts by messenger, or telephone. See generally 6 PLAMOL
& RiPERT, TRAITS PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS-OBLIGATIONS-PART I 184
(2d ed. Esmein 1952).
70. 1 AUBRY & RAU, COURS Da DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS--OBLIGATIONS (AN
ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) 308 (1965);
17 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & SAIGNAT, TRAITt TI-tORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROrT
CIVIL 26 (1900); 2 CARBONNIER, DROrT CIVIL 337 (1957); 2 COLIN ET CAPITANT,
COURS ELtMENTAIRE Dn DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS 37-38 (10th ed. 1953); 2 DEMOGUE,
TRAITS DES OBLIGATIONS EN GtNARAL 215 (1923); 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAr
PRATIQUE Dz DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS--OBLIGATIONS--PART I 186-87 (2d ed. Esmein
1952).
71. CODE NAPOLEON art. 1135, equivalent to LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1903 (1870),
has been invoked in this connection. See 2 DEMOGUE, TRAIT9 DES OBLIGATIONS
EN GtNPRAL 215 (1923).
72. See note 156 supra. The French word utilized in this context is
exp~dition.
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is nothing but a purpose in his mind, but, from the moment of
transmission, the letter belongs to the addressee. This argu-
ment does not seem to be convincing, because the postal regula-
tions in France authorize withdrawal of letters not dispatched,73
or, if dispatched, not yet delivered to the addressee.7 4 In matters
of telegrams, those not yet transmitted or delivered can be
cancelled.75
Both theories are based on the general concept of the
autonomy of the will. There is a contract the moment two
different wills exist, because consent takes place thereby.
From the viewpoint of the positive law, it has been argued
in support of these theories, that, although the Code Napoleon
does not contain a general theory of formation of contracts,
Article 198576 implies that the acceptance of a mandate might
very well be a fact unknown to the mandator, or principal.
Article 112177 is also invoked in this connection because accord-
ing to this rule, in matters of stipulation pour autrui,78 the third
party acquires an irrevocable right upon his acceptance, without
requiring its communication to the parties to the original
contract. 9
According to the third theory, that of reception, the ac-
ceptance takes place at the moment when its communication
reaches the offeror. In this conception, if a letter of acceptance
is lost, there is no contract. But it is not material whether the
offeror reads the letter containing the acceptance. Thus, if such
a letter arrives at its destination in proper time, but the offeror
is not there to receive it until after the time for acceptance has
expired, the contract will be concluded.80
The fourth, or knowledge theory, does not consider the con-
tract formed until the moment the offeror actually learns of
73. Instruction Gdndrale des Postes, of March 20, 1868, art. 389; 2
DEMOGUE, TRAITA DES OBLIGATIONS EN GAN9RAL 215 (1923).
74. Instruction no. 319, following a decision of the CGonsei d'Etat, of
August 6, 1883; 2 DEMOOUE, TRAITA DES OBLIGATIONS EN GhNARAL 215 (1923).
75. Id. Decree of Feb. 7, 1894, art. 28.
76. Equivalent to LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2989 (1870).
77. Equivalent to LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1890 (1870). See also LA. CIVnI CODE
art. 1902 (1870).
78. Third party beneficiary.
79. For an explanation that, in cases of this sort, acceptance by the
beneficiary is equivalent to ratification as In gestion d'affaires, see 2 PLANIOL,
CIVIL LAW TREATISE, PART I (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE
LAW INSTITUTE) nos. 1222-1226 (1959).
80. Cf. 2 DEMOGUR, TRAIT11 DES OBLIGATIONS EN GAN9RAL 217 (1923), and an
Italian case reported In 1 GIURISPBUDENZA ITALIANA 262 (1904), therein cited.
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the acceptance. In support of this view, it has been said that
the sole existence of two wills does not suffice, and that their
real accord requires reciprocal communication.81
Against this last theory, the objection has been raised that
it cannot explain the case of a tacit acceptance. Here, the offeree
may perform immediately upon reception of the offer. If he
were then required to make his performance known to the
offeror, the contract would come to be considered formed only
after having been performed. However, it is asserted, such an
objection does not take into account those cases in which the
acceptance is not express but is taken for granted: when an
order for furnishings is placed, the order itself implies that the
offeror is counting on the offeree's consent. It would be natural
for the latter, therefore, not to communicate in fact that he
accepts.s2  -
Another objection raised against the knowledge theory is
that it makes any contract by correspondence impossible, since
there is no reason not to require that the reception of the accept-
ance be, in its turn, communicated to the acceptor, and so ad
infinitum. However, this objection does not take into account
the fact that the concurrence of the wills exists at the moment
the acceptance arrives. As it was pointed out, the offeree does
not await an answer to his acceptance; he knows that the con-
tract will be concluded, and this consideration should suffice
as a practical matter.83
French writers reached the conclusion that a choice between
these different approaches cannot be made in a manner con-
sistent with the legal texts, as these furnish very little, if any,
guidance at all.8 4 In fact, the French legal texts only provide
solutions for a very limited number of particular situations. A
recommendation has been formulated according to which the
concept of "concurrence of the wills" should not be subject to
81. Cf. 2 DEMOGUE, TRAITA DES OBLIGATIONS EN GINtRAL 218 (1923). CODE
NAPOLEON art. 932, equivalent to LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1540 (1870), is currently
invoked in support of this view, as the rule prescribes that the acceptance
of a donation will not bind the donor until he is notified. But it has been
asserted that neither this article, nor articles 1984, 1985, and 1121, give
support to a convincing general theory because such a theory does not
seem to have been intended in the Code Napoleon. On the contrary, the
Code seems to have envisaged particular situations, prescribing solutions
accordingly. See 2 DEMOGUE, id.
82. 2 DEMOGUE, TRAIT] DES OBLIGATIONS EN GPNfIRAL 219 (1923).
83. Id. at 219-20. See 2 COLIN & CAPIrANT, COURS ELIMMENTAIRE DE DROT
CIVIL FRANgAiS 38 (10th ed. 1953).
84. Cf. 2 DEMoGUs, TaArr DES OsUOATIONS EN GINtRAL 220 (1923).
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much speculation and the choice be made according to practical
necessities. For this, a fair solution in a particular situation
should always be preferred to the one less fair that may result
from the application of a general principle.85
However, it cannot be denied that the reception and knowl-
edge theories have found strong support in doctrine in strictly
civil matters. The transmission theory seems to be favorite in
commercial matters, according to the traditional continental
distinction.8 6
In the discussion of strictly civil matters, it has been said
that the important problem is to ascertain the moment at which
the offeror will be definitely bound, and when will the offeree
be in the same situation.
When he who has proposed awaits an answer, he suffers no
harm if it is decided that, until the acceptance arrives, the offeree
may revoke it, or substitute his assent for a previous refusal.
After reception of the acceptance, on the contrary, it should be
presumed that the offeror will act in consequence thereof, and,
therefore, no revocation should be allowed. 7
The offeree's position is rather more delicate. In fact, he
considers himself bound from the moment he transmitted the
acceptance, as he assumes that his letter will arrive in time,
which is probable, although not entirely certain. This should
be taken with two reservations: in the first place, the postal
regulations make it impossible for the offeree to withdraw his
letter while still en route;88 in the second place, he can always
cancel his letter by a telegram arriving beforehand, or even at
the same time.89 Consequently, if the letter of acceptance is lost,
or arrives after the time for acceptance, it must be admitted that
there is no contract because the offeror did not get an answer,
or, at least, a timely one. The offeree should be charged with
the knowledge that there is always a chance for his acceptance
85. Id.
86. See id. at 220-223; 3 LYON-CAEN & RENAULT, TRAIT9 DE DROIT COM-
MERCIAL 24-26 (1923); 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAITA PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL*
FRANgAIS-OBLIGATIONS-PART I 188-93 (2d ed. Esmein 1952). But see 1 AUBRY &
RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS--OBLIGATIONS (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION
BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) 306-08 (1965).
87. Cf. 2 DEMOGUE, TRAIT0 DES OBLIGATIONS EN GhNgRAL 220 (1923). See also
17 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & SAIGNAT, TRAITfi THORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DIE DROIT
CIVIL 27-29 (1900).
88. See note 73 supra.
89. 2 D)EMOGU, TRAITf9 DES OBLIGATIONS EN GhNARAL 221 (1923).
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to be ineffectual. Therefore, the formula that better expresses
the more desirable solution is that there is no contract until the
arrival of the letter of acceptance. Before this precise moment,
the offeror is in a state of uncertainty, and the acceptance is
"fragile."ygo
It seems that this reasoning would leave the offeree in a state
of uncertainty, as he cannot know when he is definitely bound.
But, as it has been pointed out, while letters do generally arrive
on time, it cannot be said that offers are generally accepted.
Consequently, it seems advisable to take what is most probable
into account-the arrival of a letter without revocation or delay
and conclude that the offeree may be reasonably assured that
his letter will arrive. As it is only at this moment that the
offeror will act in consequence of the contract, it is at this
moment that the contract is formed.91
This view should not be taken to mean that the parties
cannot otherwise agree. Moreover, the parties are always con-
sidered free to stipulate expressly or impliedly that the offeror,
the offeree, or both, will be bound at the moment the letter is
posted. 92
In this approach the contract is formed at the moment of
reception or at the moment of knowledge of the acceptance, not
because then and only then would the alleged "concurrence of
the wills" take place, but because at this moment both parties
have attained a reasonable degree of certainty. A negotiation
that may result in a contract starts with successive attempts,
counter-propositions, and exchanges of views as to the possi-
bilities that the parties are discussing. Therefore, the contract
should never be considered formed while the uncertainty is too
90. Actually, it might be said that everything In the contract formation
is "fragile" until the letter of acceptance is read by the offeror. But that
that is normal, according to the regular course of events, should be pre-
sumed. Consequently, the law should assume that the offeror read the accep-
tance immediately upon reception unless strong evidence indicates the con-
trary, such as where the offeror is absent, and his place closed, at the moment
of the arrival of the letter, and there is no person that could have opened it.
See 2 DIEMOGUE, TRArT DES OBLIGATIONS EN G.NIMPAL 221 (1923).
91. Something like an unavoidable reason of conceptual symmetry
would prevent considering the contract as formed the moment of trans-
mission; as the acceptance is "fragile" until the letter arrives, by the
same token, the offer should be "fragile"-revocable-until the same moment.
Cf. 2 DEMOGUE, TRAIT2 DES OBLIGATIONS EN GANARAL 221 (1923). It can be said
that, in many situations, this symmetry of concepts will result in a fair
decision.
92. Cf. CAsS. CIV., May 9, 1904, GAZ. TRiB., 1904, 2, I, 148; 2 DIMoOUE, TsAIT*
DES OBLIGATIONS zN GbNLRAL 222 (1923).
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great. On the contrary, it should come into existence only at
the moment when the parties, knowing that they agree, are
ready to act accordingly.98
This consideration of the certainiy or the uncertainty of
the parties introduces ample flexibility in matters of approach-
ing the moment of contract formation, and it demonstrates
clearly that reception and knowledge theories in modern French
doctrine, serve the purpose of establishing a general principle,
a guideline, rather than an unavoidable rule.
Perhaps the more functional approach has been proposed94
in the following discussion of which of the four different theories
should prevail:
It is entirely dependent on the parties' will to consider the
contract formed at the moment they please, provided, of course,
it is simultaneous with or subsequent to the offeree's declara-
tion of will. If the parties have not specifically agreed on this
point, then the moment of contract formation will be determined
by interpreting their will thusly:
(a) According to the intention of the parties, especially the
-one who makes the offer, the acceptance should, or may, be im-
plied as the consequence of an act of the offeree, other than an
express declaration of his will, performed before the knowledge
of it is brought home to the offeror. In such a case, the contract
is born at the moment and at the place the act constituting
acceptance is performed by the offeree, and a revocation of the
offer that subsequently reaches him would be ineffectual.95
This solution should prevail where the offeror requests that
certain services be rendered immediately: where an order is
placed with a merchant with specific instructions to ship, store,
or deliver; where an order is placed with a broker in the stock
market; where offers of reward are made to whoever shall
render a certain service. In all these cases the contract is con-
cluded solely by fulfilling the order or rendering the service.
In this type of situation, when the offeree is a professional, or
93. 2 DEMOGuE, TRAITS DES OBLIGATIONS EN GfNPRAL 223 (1923).
94. 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAIT]O PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS-OBLIGA-
TIONS-PART I 188 (2d ed. Esmein 1952).
95. Of. FRANCO-ITALIAN PROJET art. 4 (1928). This is also the solution
adopted in matters of risks in course of delivery for commercial sales.
See 3 LYON-CAEN & RENAULT, TRAITfa DE DROIT COMMERCIAL 101, 178-80 (1923);
6 PLA1I41L & RIPERT, "TRAITA PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANAIs---OBLIGATIONB--
PART I 188 (2d ed. Esmein 1952); FRENCH CoMm. CODE art. 100 (1807) .
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a merchant, he should give immediate notice to the offeror in
case of refusal or he will incur a special liability.96 As a conse-
quence of the contract being concluded by performance, the
offeree cannot cancel it by preventing completion of such per-
formance, as, for instance, by arresting the goods while they are
on their way to the offeror.9 7
It is the same thing when the offeror is the one who per-
forms simultaneously with the making of the offer. Thus, when
he ships to the offeree the things that he proposes to sell, deposit,
or lend, and the offeree receives and keeps them with the in-
tention of accepting, the contract is concluded.9 8
In all cases in which the acceptance is inferred because the
offeree remains silent, the contract should not be considered
formed at the moment the offer is received, but at the moment
when the offeror, not having received a negative answer, is
reasonably led to believe that the contract is concluded. Until
that moment, the existence of the concurrence of the parties'
wills remains uncertain.9
(b) In all cases other than those considered in (a), there
is no contract:
(1) If a letter revoking the offer crosses in the mail with
the letter of acceptance, and the former arrives at its destina-
tion prior to the latter.
(2) If a letter containing the revocation of the acceptance
arrives prior to, or at the same time as, the letter of acceptance.1' °
96. Nimes, May 13, 1932, D.H. 1932, 404; Trib. Seine, Aug. 22, 1882,
GAZ. PAL., 81-82, 2, 398; see generally 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAIT§ PRATIQUE
DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS-OBLIGATIONS-PART I 160 (2d ed. Esmein 1952).
97. 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAITb PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS-OBLIGA-
TIONS-PART I 189 (2d ed. Esmein 1952). Compare with the common law
discussion of the effects of part performance in CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 58,
59 (1952). See also JONES, FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, CONTRACTS 114-15 (1965);
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 45 (1932).
98. Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1816 (1870). According to conventional usages,
the same solution may prevail even where the offeror does not perform
simultaneously with the offer, for the offeree may, under certain circum-
stances, take immediate action in consequence of the contract upon recep-
tion of the offer and, for instance, resell the goods which are the object
of the offer. This solution expedites commercial transactions, although
creating certain problems in case of bankruptcy of the offeree. See 6
PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAIT]§ PRATIQUE 'DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIs-OBLIGATONS-
PART I 189 (2d ed. Esmein 1952).
99. 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAITh PRATIQUE BE DRorr CIVIL FRANgAIS-OBLIGA-
TIONs-PART I 190 (2d ed. Esmein 1952).
100. Cf. Paris, May 31, 1937, D.H. 1937, 431; Nimes, March 4, 1908, S.
1910, 2, 106.
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(3) If the letter of acceptance does not arrive at its des-
tination.10'
These solutions, of course, could not be admitted by the
theory of transmission, which, it is strongly recommended, should
not be taken as the general principle governing this matter.10 2
(c) As the will of the parties is sovereign, the court may,
at any time, arrive at the conclusion that it was the offeror's
understanding that he would be bound before learning from
the acceptance, or, on the contrary, that his understanding was
that he would not be bound until learning not only from the
acceptance, but also from the accessory undertaking of a third
party.08 The offeror may also make the formation of the con-
tract depend on the occurrence of any other event, or on the
execution of a writing, or on the accomplishment of a certain
performance. 0 4
As to the French jurisprudence, the Cour de Cassation has
refused to adopt either theory. 0 5 There are, however, numerous
decisions upholding either the reception or the knowledge theo-
ries. 0 0 In one case,107 the court asserted that the moment of
formation of a contract is in general a question of fact, more
than one of law. Notwithstanding, the same decision has been
101. Of. Chamb~ry, June 8, 1877, S. 77, 2, 252; 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRArIt
PRATIQUE Da DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS-OBLIGATIONS-PART I 190 (2d ed. Esmein
1952).
102. 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAITf0 PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS-OBLIGA-
TIONS-PART I 190 (2d ed. Esmein 1952).
103. Req., Aug. 6, 1867, S. 67, 1, 400, D. 68, 1, 35. Cf. 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT,
TRAin PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS-OBLIGATIONS-PART I 190 (2d ed.
Esmein 1952).
104. Of. 6 PLANIOL & RiPERT, TRAITA PRATIQUE DE DROT CIVIL FRANgAIS--
OBLIGATIONS-PART I 123-24, 190 (2d ed. Esmeln 1952).
105. 2 COLIN & CAPITANT, COURS ELtMENTAIRB DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS 38
(10th ed. 1953); 2 DEMOGUE, TRAITt DES OBLIGATIONS EN GaNARPAL 212-15 (1923);
6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAITb PRATIQUE D5 DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS--OBLIGATIONS-
PART I 187 (2d ed. Esmein 1952).
106. Ploux v. Roullin, Nov. 21, 1949, D. 1950, J, 236; Req., June 16, 1913,
D. 1914, I, 229; Aix, Nov. 23, 1908, S. 1910, 2, 6; D. 1909, 2, 61; Nimes, March
4, 1908, S. 1910, 2, 106; Toulouse, June 13, 1901, D. 1902, 2, 16; Amiens, April
26, 1887, Rec. Amiens, 1888, 52; Orleans, June 26, 1885, S. 1886, 2, 30, D. 1886,
2, 135 ("Whereas it is a principle of the law of contracts that the concur-
rence of the will is necessary to have a binding agreement, and this agree-
ment cannot result from a fiction, but it must be real, effective, and not
to leave any doubt as to the agreement and the mutual assent . . . it is
only from the moment when the letter containing the acceptance has
reached the offeror, and has been effectively received by him, that the
contract has become definitive."); Chambery, June 8, 1877, S. 1877, 2, 252,
D. 1878, 2, 113; Lyon, April 29, 1875, S. 1875, 2, 263.
107. REq., March 21, 1932, S. 1932, 1, 279, D. 1933, 1, 65, followed in Trib.
de Loches, June 25, 1945, D. 1947, J, 113.
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interpreted as adopting the theory of declaration.05 Actually,
the case deals with the determination of the court's jurisdiction
under Article 420 of the French Code of Civil Procedure.' ° 9 The
vast majority of French decisions adhering to the theories of
declaration or transmission, were actually cases where the issue
was the place, and not the time of contract formation, for pur-
poses of jurisdiction, or law applicable." 0 This overlapping of
the two questions is what causes a certain indefiniteness of
French jurisprudence."'
As to courts of appeal, the tribunals other than the Cour de
Cassation, it has been said that, "when dealing specifically with
the problem of the time, and not the place of formation of the
contract, they have allowed their decisions to be governed by
equity considerations." 2 It is here submitted, however, that
French courts entering judgment in strict civil matters have
upheld the reception theory any time that no particular harsh-
ness resulted for the offeree. 118
108. See note by Sall de la Marniere in Trib. de Loches, June 25, 1945,
D. 1947, J, 113. The decision reads: ". . . on the other hand, the formation
of the promise is realized and the contract becomes perfect by the accep-
tance of the propositions, from the moment that this acceptance takes
place .. " But the Chambre Civile, by decision of Feb. 2, 1932, S. 1932, 1, 68,
through dismissal of a writ of review, indirectly consecrated the theory of
reception. See 2 COLIN wr CAPITANT, COURs EL19MENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS
38 (10th ed. 1953).
109. "The plaintiff shall have the choice to file suit . . . before the
court with jurisdiction over the district where the promise was made and
the goods were delivered ... " For a discussion of this particular problem,
see 191 infra.
110. Grenoble, Aug. 1, 1913, GAZ. PAL., 1914, I, 137; Poitiers, Nov. 4, 1886,
GAZ. PAL., 1886, 2, 907; Rennes, Feb. 6, 1873, S. 1873, 2, 261, D. 1875, 2, 224;
Caen, June 15, 1871, D. 1872, 5, 111; Colmar, Feb. 17, 1840, S. 1840, 2, 385.
See 2 DEMOGUE, TRArr DES OBLIGATIONS EN GitNgRAL 213 (1923); 6 PLANIOL &
RIPERT, TnArr PRATIQUE DE Dnorr CIVIL FRANQAIS-OBLIGATIONS-PART I 187
no 5 (2d ed. Esmein 1952).
111. However, a careful analysis of what is ratio decidendi, and what is
obiter dicta in these decisions might help to clarify the French jurispru-
dential trend.
112. Cf. 6 PLANIOL & RPERT, TRArri PRATIQUE DE DRorr CIviM FRANgmS-
OBLIGATIONs-PART I 187 nO 5, 188 (2d ed. Esmeln 1952).
113. But see 2 ARMINJON, NOLDE & WOLFF, TRAIT DE DR0IT COMPARt
19 (1950), where It is asserted that the Cour de Cassation adhered to the
declaration theory in the already famous decision of 1932 cited above. The
same writers express the view that the current opinion according to which
the moment of contract formation is pure question of fact is untenable.
1 AUBRY & RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS-OBLIGATIONS (AN ENGLISH
TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) 308 (1965) expounds the
theory of transmission as the general principle applicable In all situations;
the same theory is regarded as the more sound in Mazeaud, REvuE TRiMs-
STRIELLE 507 (1956). Cf. AMOS & WALTON, INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW 157
(2d ed. 1963). In a draft for the new French Civil Code, the transmission
theory is followed. See TRAVAUX DE LA COMMISSION DE REFORME DU CODE CIVIL
681 (1950): "Unless otherwise provided by the parties, a contract between
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
In commercial matters, the view mentioned elsewhere pre-
vails.114 In this connection, it is worthwhile to notice that an
even more clearcut dual solution exists in Spanish law, where
the Civil Code was inspired by the theory of reception, and the
Commercial Code by that of transmission."5
German Law
In German law, the theory of reception seems to have in-
spired section 130 of the Civil Code, providing that a declaration
of will addressed to a person who is not present shall become
effective at the moment it arrives."16 This "arrival" of the decla-
ration has been interpreted to mean the moment at which the
addressee can find out for himself, in the normal course of events,
what is contained in the declaration, or when he can be expected
to know it. 17 The importance of this last aspect, the common
expectation of the offeror "learning" of the acceptance, has been
stressed in German doctrine, thereby implying that the knowl-
edge theory cannot be discarded, for it is very rich in legal
consequences." 8
In an attempt to clarify the true meaning of the word
"arrival," the suggestion was made that it should be taken as
the instant when the acceptance enters the sphere of the offeror's
power, or, in other words, when he is in a position to get the
instrument containing the acceptance, through the exercise of
his own activity."9
It follows that, in spite of the fact that the legal text
adheres to the moment of reception, German doctrine interprets
persons not in the presence of each other is formed at the time and place
of the transmission of the acceptance." For a general discussion of the
problem of risks in the transmission of a declaration of will, see 6 PLANIOL &
RIPERT, TRAITA PRATIQUE DE DROT CIVIL FRANgAIS-OBLIGATIONS-PART I 185-86
(2d ed. Esmein 1952). In case of error in the transmission, it Is understood
that the maker of the declaration should stand the consequences. See Trib.
Com. du Havre, June 21, 1922, Rec. du Havre, 1922, 209, also July 31, 1923,
Rec. du Havre, 1923, 24.
114. See text accompanying note 86 supra.
115. SPANISH CIVIL CODE art. 1262 (1889): "The acceptance made by letter
does not bind the offeror until it is acknowledged." COMMERCIAL CODE OF
SPAIN art. 54 (1829): "Contracts by Correspondence are perfect the moment
the answer is given to the original proposition or to the conditions that
modify it." See 2 Puio BRUTAU, FUNDAMENTOS DE DERECHO CIVIL, PART I 221-22
(1954); 3 PUro PERA, TRATADO DE DERECHO CIVIL ESPAROL, PART II 461-64 (1966).
116. See Part I, 28 LA. L. REV. 1, 37 n.168.
117. 1 ENNECCERUS-NPPERDEY, ALLGEMEINER TEiL, LEHRBUCH DES BURGER-
LICHEN RECHTS, PART II 666 (1955).
118. Id. at 667, no 9.
119. Id. at 667, ff c.
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it by elaborating a kind of modified theory of knowledge, or
information.120 the legal consequences attached to the fact of
communicating the acceptance are, thus, made to depend not
only on the offeree's activity, but also on the offeror's coopera-
tion.121 This doctrinal effort is perfectly justified, because, by
charging the addressee of a declaration of will (the offeror, in
this case) with this peculiar duty of cooperation, it becomes
very clear that if he refuses the expected cooperation, the ac-
ceptance will be effective even though he has no knowledge of
it. 22 As a rule, then, the contract is perfected the moment the
offeree has done all in his power to make the acceptance avail-
able to the offeror, and only the latter's activity is required to
take the actual possession of the instrument or learn its con-
tent.1
28
The line between what the offeree is expected to do and
what the offeror is to do, is drawn according to usage and the
practices of commerce.1
24
The risk in the transmission of the acceptance, according to
this conception, is placed upon the one who must act in order
to see that the declaration of will accomplishes its end: the risk
is upon the offeree while he is trying to make the acceptance
reach the offeror; upon the offeror, while he is supposed to
secure for himself the knowledge of the acceptance.125 The
120. In reality, the four debated theories constitute only two different
viewpoints: (a) the moment declaration is expressed (declaration and trans-
mission); (b) the moment the declaration reaches the addressee (reception
and knowledge). German doctrine definitively favors the second viewpoint,
but combines very aptly the two theories derived from the same into a
veritable new conception. But see ARMINJON, NOLDE & WOLFF, TRAITA DE
DROIT COMPARP 20 (1950).
121. 1 ENNECCERUS-NIPPERDEY, ALLGEMEINER TEiL, LEHRBUCH DES BURGER-
LICHEN RECHTS, PART II 667, c (1955).
122. For instance, when the offeror does not have his mail delivered,
but takes it personally at the post office, if he does not collect the letter of
acceptance, the contract will notwithstanding be perfected. The same when
the offeror receives notice from the post office to collect a letter; but not
when a registered letter is delivered at the offeror's address and taken
back for absence of the addressee. Cf. 56 R.G.Z. 262 (1904); see also 125
R.G.Z. 75 (1929); 105 R.G.Z. 255 (1923); and 60 R.G.Z. 334 (1905).
123. 1 ENNECCERUS-NIPPERDEY, ALLGEMEINER TEL, LEHRBUCH DES BURGER-
LICHEN RECHTS, PART II 667 (1955).
124. Id. at 667, d.
125. Cf. 58 R.G.Z. 409 (1905): "When the receiving party is the only one
at fault, or is guilty of deceit, the delayed communication shall be deemed
to have been timely received." For an interesting case where both parties
Incurred some degree of carelessness in the transmission and reception of
the acceptance, see 97 R.G.Z. 336 (1920). In this case, the contract was not
considered formed and the court divided the damages between the parties
by application of art. 254 of the Civil Code: "If any fault of the injured
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parties, however, are entirely free to covenant any requirements
to be fulfilled by the arrival of the letter of acceptance, as
Article 130 of the BGB does not prevent that sort of stipula-
tion. 126 It should be remembered that the BGB contemplates
expressly several instances in which reception of the acceptance
is not required for the formation of the contract."'
In sum, the theories of reception and knowledge, expertly
combined, have had a definite impact on German law. The word-
ing of the Civil Code according to the first of these conceptions
has allowed a consistent trend in judicial decisions in which the
decisive importance Of usages has been considered in minute
detail. 128
Common Law
At common law, in matters of contracts by correspondence,
the leading case of Adams v. Lindsel1129 set up the rule that a
mailed acceptance becomes effective upon dispatch.'3 However,
under this particular heading, a whole set of controversies are
presented. 81 Courts have considered the basic question-when
does the mailed acceptance take effect-and have answered it
as follows:
(a) Where a letter containing a revocation of the offer
crosses a letter of acceptance in the mails both the moment of
effectiveness of the acceptance and the moment of effectiveness
party has contributed to cause the injury, the duty to make reparation, and
the extent of it, shall depend on the circumstances of the case, especially
upon the extent to which the injury was caused chiefly by one or the other
party ...-
126. Cf. 108 R.G.Z. 96 (1924).
127. B.G.B. art. 151; see note 34 supra.
128. R. G. Warn no 157 (1919); 59 R.G.E. 300 (1905); R. G. Recht 616
(1905). However, it should be noticed that in matters of the risks of
transmission, although on a less explicit conceptual basis, French juris-
prudence arrives at practically the same results.
129. In the King's Bench, 1 Barn. & Ald. 681 (1818).
130. See CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 78 (1952); FULLER & BRAUCHER, BASIC CON-
TRACT LAW 282-86 (1964); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 81 (3d ed. 1957). The rule
of this case was usually explained by asserting that there was implied
authority for the offeree to use the same means of communication the
offeror employed. Thus, the fiction that made the post office the offeror's
agent became a necessary conceptual ground. But this theory was limited,
and has been repudiated; see Henthorn v. Fraser, L.R. (1892) 2 Ch. 27.
In 9 TUL. L. REV. 592 (1935), It is suggested that the American approach to
this problem is decidedly different, and that the objective manifestation of
mutual assent substitutes, in American law, for the repudiated subjective
theory of mutual assent.
131. See FULLER & BRAUCHER, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 283 (1964); 2 Puie
BRUTAU, FUNDAMENTOS DE DERECHO CIVIL, PART I 228 (1954).
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of the revocation are taken into consideration. Different combi-
nations of those two different moments are possible;132 and, in
general terms, the solution that proves most successful is assert-
ing that the acceptance takes effect on dispatch, but the revoca-
tion become effective when received. 188 Therefore, if a letter of
revocation by the offeror reaches the offeree after he has mailed
the acceptance, the contract will be already formed, and the
revocation ineffective. But, if such a letter arrives before the
acceptance is dispatched, there is no contract, even though the
offeree has already made up his mind to accept. 84
(b) Provided that it was properly posted, the delay or loss
of a letter of acceptance will not affect the validity of the con-
tract. 88 It is assumed that it is not the offeree's fault that causes
the delay or loss. The risk, in such cases, is the offeror's, unless
he has made his offer in such a way as to prevent it.186
(c) Where a certain situation calls for the ascertainment
of the date from which the parties are to be regarded as liable
under the contract, or, in other words, the time at which con-
tractual liability starts, the posting of the acceptance is, again,
the decisive moment. 1 7
132. The following combinations are presented as possible in FULLER &
BRAUCHER, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 283 (1964):
"A. Acceptance effective on dispatch.
"Revocation effective on dispatch.
"B. Acceptance effective on receipt.
"Revocation effective on receipt.
"C. Acceptance effective on receipt.
"Revocation effective on dispatch.
"D. Acceptance effective on dispatch.
"Revocation effective on receipt."
133. Id.: "Rule D is that which has generally been applied in the com-
mon law. See Restatement of Contracts §§ 41 and 64. In civil law coun-
tries, despite a great doctrinal controversy, it is generally assumed that
Rule B controls, except, where some other rule is definitely embodied in
legislation. In California, Montana, North Dakota, and South Dakota, Rule A
has apparently been adopted by statute. See Williston on Contracts § 56.
Rule C seems to have been applied by the court which decided Geary v.
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 1936, 287 Ill. App. 626, 5 N.E.2d 266, though
the decision was later reversed in 366 Ill. 625, 10 N.E.2d 350."
134. Wertheimer v. Wehle-Hartford Co., 126 Conn. 30, 9 A.2d 279 (1939);
Jennette Bros. Co. v. Hovey & Co., 184 N.C. 140, 113 S.E. 665 (1922); Patrick v.
Bowman, 149 U.S. 411, 424, 37 L.Ed. 790, 13 S.Ct. 811, 866 (1893); RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS § 41 (1932).
135. FULLER & BRAUCHER, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 283 (1964); Household
Fire & Carriage Acc. Ins. Co. v. Grant, 4 Exch. Div. 216 (1879).
136. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 78, at 127 (1952).
137. See Tayloe v. Merchant's Fire Insurance Co., 9 How. 390 (U.S.S.C.
1850); FULLER & BRAUCHER, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 283 (1964): "In the Swiss law
a contract results only when the acceptance is received, but § 10 of the LAW
OP OBLIGATIONS provides that the contract, when formed, shall be regarded
as having been in effect from the time of the dispatch of the acceptance."
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(d) When an acceptance is overtaken by an attempted re-
jection of the offer, the problem presents certain difficulties.
According to traditional views, since the acceptance is binding
from the moment it is mailed, a subsequent rejection of the
offer should have no effect, even if it reaches the offeror prior
to the acceptance. 138 Moreover, it has been asserted that the fact
that the sender of a letter may regain possession of it should
have no effect on the validity of the acceptance. 189 This brings
the postal regulations into discussion, and, in this connection, a
contrary view has been advanced. When those regulations allow
the sender the right to withdraw a letter from the post office,'140
the acceptance is not final until the letter reaches its destina-
tion. 141 However, the holdings in the cases in which this line of
reasoning was expressed may be more reasonably interpreted to
mean that the acceptance, although still effective upon dispatch,
it now legally revocable by an overtaking communication. 42
This can be supported by the fact that the offeror does not
change his position during the time the letter of acceptance is
in the mail, and he assumes no additional risk, whether or not
the acceptance is withdrawn or there is an overtaking revoca-
tion.143 Despite the presence of postal regulations permitting
withdrawal, the great majority of the courts have not considered
that privilege and have continued to hold that an acceptance is
communicated upon mailing. 44
138. 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 81, at 266 (3d ed. 1957); Cohen v. First Nat.
Bank, 22 Ariz. 394, 198 Pac. 122 (1921). But see CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 94 n. 39,
at 142 (1952); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 39 (1932).
139. See 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 86, at 278 (3d ed. 1957).
140. See POSTAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS §§ 42.22, 42.23, 52.44, 59.68, 108.31,
and 115.1 (1948). See also 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 86, at 277 (3d ed. 1957).
141. See Rhode Island Tool Co. v. United States, 130 Ct. Cl. 698, 128 F.
Supp. 417 (1955): "When this new regulation became effective, the entire
picture was changed. The sender now does not lose control of the letter the
moment it is deposited in the post office, but retains the right of control up
to the time of delivery. The acceptance, therefore, is not final until the letter
reaches destination, since the sender has the absolute right of withdrawal
from the post office, and even the right to have the postmaster at the delivery
point return the letter at any time before actual delivery." Of. Dick v. United
States, 113 Ct. Cl. 94, 82 F.Supp. 326 (1949); Trader's Nat. Bank v. First Nat.
Bank, 142 Tenn. 229, 237, 217 S.W. 977, 979 (1920). See generally, FULLER &
BRAUCHER, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 285 (1964).
142. See Note, Dispatch of Mailed Acceptance Held Not Necessarily Final
as to Both Parties, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1949). Actually, the case dealing
with a clear situation where a letter of acceptance is overtaken by a tele-
gram of rejection is Dick v. United States, 113 Ct. Cl. 94, 82 F.Supp. 326 (1949).
143. Id.
144. See Note, Telegraphic Rejection of Offer Held Effective When Re-
ceived Prior to Previously Mailed Acceptance, 35 VA. L. REv. 508 (1949);
Geary v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 366 Ill. 625, 10 N.E. 2d 350 (1937); Corcoran
v. Leon's, Inc., 126 Neb. 149, 252 N.W. 819 (1934).
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The solution to this particular problem should not rest on
the sender's power to control the letter of acceptance. 1 45 This
is nothing but an attempt to bestow logical consistency on the
rule of effectiveness upon dispatch: the acceptance would take
effect at that particular moment, because from then on the
offeree would have no power to prevent the letter from reaching
its destination. But the "effectiveness upon dispatch," or "mail-
box" rule is not necessary to this logical explanation. The im-
portant thing is to decide whether or not posting a letter can
be reasonably regarded as a proper method of accepting an
offer. 146 It is, certainly, proper when a contract between distant
persons is involved, because the offeree is provided with some
degree of protection against the offeror's practically unrestrained
power to revoke the offer. 147 If it is conceded that the "mailbox"
rule seeks to protect the offeree, then no doubts should be raised
against the validity of either intercepting the letter of acceptance
by withdrawing it from the post office, or overtaking it by com-
municating a rejection by a faster means, as no harm is caused
to the offeror, who is left in a position to act according to what
he learns first. To conclude that there is no contract in either
situation appears consistent with the underlying purpose of
protecting the offeree. 48
(e) The sender's lack of control after posting the letter and
the fiction that the offeror makes the post his agent when the
offer is made by mail have been traditionally presented as the
rationale of the "mailbox" rule. This has been an attempt to
harmonize the established rule with the prevailing views on
mutual assent; but, if this line of reasoning is carried to its
logical conclusion, the posting of a letter or the filing of a tele-
gram will complete a contract only when the offer is received
through the same medium, as only then it could be said with
some degree of accuracy that the offeror has made that medium
his agent for the receipt of the acceptance. 4 9 But the courts
differ as to the scope of application of the rule. When an offer
is made by letter there is no difficulty in applying the rule that
acceptance by the same method is valid upon dispatch, because
the means the offeror utilized to communicate is a sufficient
145. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 80, at 128 (1952).
146. Id. § 78, at 125; § 80, at 128.
147. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 78, at 126 (1952); FULLER & BRAICHER, BASIC
CONTRACT LAW 285 (1964).
148. Accord, CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 80. at 129 (1952).
149. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 78 (1952); GRISmOR, CONTRACTS § 48, at 70
(Murray 1965).
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indication that it is reasonable for the acceptance to be made
in the same manner. The same results can be reached when the
offer and the acceptance are made by telegram or any other
mode of communication used by both parties. 150 Problems have
arisen when courts were called upon to decide cases in which
the criterion of the same mode of communication could not be
used. In many instances they have been inflexible in limiting
the application of the "mailbox" rule only to the situations in
which both parties used the same mode of communication. 151 A
more realistic approach was adopted by an English court in
Henthorn v. Fraser,52 in which the reasonable contemplation
of the parties and the common usages were taken into account
to determine the scope of the rule. The Uniform Commercial
Code, section 2-206 (1) (a), seems to agree: "An offer to make
a contract shall be construed as inviting acceptance in any
manner and by any medium reasonable in the circumstances." 53
Of course, the offeror is always free to prevent the application
of the rule that posting a letter, or filing a telegram of acceptance
completes a contract, by stipulating otherwise in his offer.'" 4
The same result follows whenever it is clearly understood by
both parties, although not expressed in words, that the reception
of the acceptance is essential. 5 5 The application of the rule pre-
supposes that the letter, or telegram, is properly addressed, and
the regular charges paid, so that delivery can take place in due
course.'"
150. d.
151. Dickey v. Hurd, 33 F.2d 415 (1st Cir. 1929), where the offer comes
by mail, filing a telegram of acceptance with the telegraph company will
not consummate a contract. See also Lucas v. Western Union Tel. Co., 131
Iowa 669, 109 N.W. 191 (1906). Scottish-American Mortgage Co. v. Davis, 96
,Tex. 504, 74 S.W. 17 (1908), where the offer came to the offeree by mail,
posting a letter of acceptance would not complete the contract when this
letter was directed to the offeror, whereas the offer had come from the
offeror's agent. But see Jennette Bros. Co. v. Hovey & Co., 184 N.C. 140, 113
S.E. 665 (1922), an offer handed to the offeree personally may be accepted
in a proper case by posting a letter; Stephen M. Weld & Co. v. Victory Mfg.
Co., 205 F. 770 (E.D.N.C. 1913), filing a telegram may complete a contract
when the offer came by mail.
152. 2 Ch. 27 (1892); "I should prefer to state the rule thus: Where the
circumstances are such that it must have been within the contemplation of
the parties that according to the ordinary usages of mankind, the post might
be used as a means of communicating the acceptance of an offer, the accep-
tance is complete as soon as it is posted."
153. Cf. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 64, 66, and 68 (1932).
154. See generally GRISMORE, CONTRACTS § 48, at 71 (Murray ed. 1965);
CORBIx, CONTRACTS § 88 (1952).
155. See generally text accompanying note 40 supra.
156. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 80, at 729 (1952); GRISMoRE, CONTRACTS § 48, at 71
(Murray ed. 1965); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 67 (1932): "An acceptance
sent by mail or otherwise from a distance is not operative when dis-
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(f) When there is an error in the transmission of the mes-
sage of acceptance, the loss should be suffered by the sender.1 57
This rule, however, presupposes that the receiver is innocent,
and there is nothing to cause him to suspect an error.158 If there
are any circumstances indicating a probable error in the trans-
mission, good faith requires him to investigate before taking
action.159 Nor is the rule applicable in the case of a forged mes-
sage, for the supposed sender cannot be charged with using the
means of communication through which the forgery occurs. In
has been suggested that the test by which the terms of an offer
or acceptance are interpreted is not what the party making it
thought it meant or intended it to mean, but what a reasonable
person in the parties' position would have thought it meant.'
In general, the party making use of an intermediary who makes
a mistake in the words transmitted is bound by the mistake of
the intermediary.161
patched, unless It Is properly addressed and any other precaution taken
which is ordinarily observed to insure safe transmission of similar messages."
157. Ayer v. Western Union Tel. Co., 79 Me. 493, 499, 10 A. 495, 497
(1887): "It is evident that in case of an error In the transmission of a
telegram, either the sender or receiver must often suffer loss. As between
the two, upon whom should the loss finally fall§ We think the safer and
more equitable rule, and the rule the public can most easily adapt itself
to, is that, as between sender and receiver, the party who selects the tele-
graph as the means of communication shall bear the loss caused by the
errors of the telegraph. The first proposer can select one of many modes
of communication, both for the proposal and the answer. The receiver has
no such choice, except as to his answer. If it cannot safely act upon the
message he receives through the agency selected by the proposer, business
must be seriously hampered and delayed. The use of the telegraph has
become so general, and so many transactions are based on the words of
the telegram received, any other rule would now be impracticable." Contra,
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Cowin & Co., 20 F.2d 103, 54 A.L.R. 1362 (8th
Cir. 1927). Cf. Webbe v. Western Union Tel. Co., 169 Ill. 610, 48 N.E. 670
(1897).
158. Ayer v. Western Union Tel. Co., 79 Me. 493, 10 A. 495 (1887).
159. Id.
160. See 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 94, at 339 (1957).
161. Id. § 94, at 342. However, It is noteworthy that: "The Massachusetts
Supreme Court has now adhered to the view that the relation between
the sender of a telegram and the company is that of patron and public
service enterprise. Therefore, the offeror Is not bound by the terms of a
negligently transmitted offer but is only under a duty to use due care
to mitigate damages arising therefrom. Hotz v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
294 Mass. 543, N.E.2d 180 (1936)." Id. at n.12. In this connection, it should
be remembered that: "In England the telegraph lines are In the' control
of the government, and are operated by the post office department. Atten-
tion does not seem to have been called in the American cases to the
difference in this respect of the telegraph from the post office as a medium
of transmission." Id. at 278 n.1. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Cowin & Co.,
20 F.2d 103, 54 A.L.R. 1363 (8th Cir. 1927). In fact, to consider the tele-
graph as a public Instrumentality may have a definitive impact on the
fiction that makes the telegraph the party's agent.
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The above discussion points out the importance of the rule
established in Adams v. Lindsell to the solution of the problems
clustered around the acceptance. Several shortcomings of this
rule have been indicated and summarized thus: (1) The offeror
will be bound without knowing whether or not his offer was
accepted. (2) The selling offeror who sells his goods to another
after waiting a reasonable time for an answer, will be liable
for damages when the acceptance was delayed or lost in the
mail. (3) The buying offeror will suffer likewise, if, in the same
situation, he decides to buy the goods elsewhere. The acceptance
once mailed cannot be revoked. (4) A revocation that arrives
before the acceptance will have no effect. (5) There will be a
contract even if the offeree withdraws his letter from the post
office, or prevents its delivery to the offeror 6 2 These undesirable
results would not be possible under the traditional civil law
approach which, as a general rule, makes completion of the con-
tract dependent upon reception, or knowledge, of the accept-
ance.16
It has been suggested that English as well as American
courts are aware of the unsatisfactory results of this doctrine,
but that they keep upholding it because of the revocability
doctrine, which doctrine might very well be the "root of the
trouble."1 4
The doctrine according to which, at common law, an offer
can be revoked any time before it is accepted, has been linked
to the Adams v. Lindsell rule by focusing attention on the
offeree's position.16 It may be that he has to take immediate
measures in contemplation of the proposed contract. In case of
a buying offer, the offeree may order new merchandise to re-
place his stock, or in the case of a selling offer, he may proceed
to clear his stock; he may also reject other offers and make new
offers himself.166 In order to protect the offeree against these
uncertainties, it would seem fair to hold the offeror to the
promise expressed in his offer. This has been achieved in Ger-
manic and Latin countries by departing from the revocability
rule, either by express language of the law, as in Germany, or by
162. Nussbaum, The Offer and Acceptance Doctrine, 36 COLUM. L. REV.
921 (1936).
163. Id. at 922.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 925.
166. Id.
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jurisprudential construction, as in France.10' The same exigen-
cies and needs that led the civil law countries to that solution
have also been felt in England, but there, the consideration
doctrine does not permit an offer to be held irrevocable when
not made for value, nor under seal. The same doctrine prevents
holding the offeror liable for damages in case of a revocation.
Under the circumstances, the protection of the offeree can only
be obtained through a rule such as in Adams v. Lindsell, as this
is a solution that can be reconciled with the consideration doc-
trine.168 The persistent survival of this rule acquires, thus, a very
reasonable explanation.
Louisiana Law
In Louisiana law, a reading of Articles 1809 and 1819 of the
Louisiana Civil Code leads to the conclusion that the theory of
knowledge, or information, was adopted by the redactors. The
language of the legal texts is sufficiently indicative, particularly
if attention is focused on the expression reciprocally communi-
cated found in the second of the articles mentioned.
This interpretation finds support in two different argu-
ments. In the first place, it is consistent with the original source
of the law.169 Furthermore, there is sufficient grounds to support
167. See Part I, 28 LA. L. REV. 1 21-29 (1967); FULLER & BRAUCHER, BASIC
CONTRACT LAW 285 (1964); 2 Puio BRUTAU, FUNDAMENTOS DE DERECHO CIVIL,
PART I 210-211 (1954); Nussbaum, The Offer and Acceptance Doctrine, 36
COLUm. L. REV. 925 (1936).
168. Nussbaum, The Offer and Acceptance Doctrine, 36 COLUM. L. REV.
925-926 (1936): "From a business point of view Adams v. Lindsell results in
enabling the offeree to take, at once and in full legal security, all the
steps he deems appropriate to utilize the opportunities of the offer. As to
the offeror his situation is considerably like the one existing in continental
law. Not only is the period of revocation curtailed, but the offeror having
mailed the offer will soon find himself in a state of uncertainty as long
as there is no answer. This uncertainty will restrain him from acting contrary
to the offer, e.g., selling the offered goods to a third person. It may be
noteworthy that Adams v. Lindsell is a commercial case and It certainly
is not a pure accident that only six years before the irrevocability doctrine
had been definitely set out in continental legislation (Austrian Code)."
See also FULLER & BRAUCHER, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 285 (1964).
It is noteworthy to compare this result with those obtained through
the protection of the reliance interest which "receives a much wider
(though often covert) recognition In the decisions than it does in the
textbooks." See Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Dam-
ages, 46 YALE L.J. 418-20 (1937). See also RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 90 (1932);
Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. App. 1959); Drennan v. Star
Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958); Goodman v. Dicker, 83
U.S. App. D.C. 353, 169 F.2d 684 (1948). Cf. James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros.,
64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933).
169. See Part I, 28 LA. L. REV. 1, 33-35 (1967); see also Pascal, Duration
and Revocability o1 an Offer, 1 LA. L. REV. 183, 193 (1939).
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the view that the time necessary for the acceptance to reach
the offeror is one of the circumstances to be taken into account
in order to determine the reasonable period of time during which
the offeror is to be considered bound by the offer.'70 If that is
the case, the contract is not perfected at the moment the offeree
parts with the communication of the acceptance, but at the
moment the communication arrives at its destination. In the
second place, as Louisiana law adopted the rule of irrevocability
of the offer during a reasonable period of time, in the civil law
tradition,17 1 the offeree is furnished with sufficient protection
and, therefore, the factors justifying the "mailbox" rule estab-
lished in Adams v. Lindsell are not present. In other words, the
rule of irrevocability of the offer, coupled with the rule of forma-
tion of the contract at the moment the acceptance reaches the
offeror, provides adequate and fair protection to the interest of
both parties, facilitates certainty in matters of business trans-
actions, and allows a harmonic interpretation of the legal texts.
As a matter of course, the express or implied intention of
the parties, when found, should govern. Thus, in all cases where
the acceptance can be presumed, it should be understood that
the contract was formed at the moment when the circumstances
giving rise to the presumption occurred. 172 The parties should
always be free to agree on this subject as they deem fit, and,
finally, the offeror may resign his right of becoming bound only
upon arrival of the acceptance. 78
This specific topic, the "moment" of contract formation, does
not seem to have been the object of express pronouncement by
170. See Part I, 28 LA. L. Rsv. 1, 40 (1967). Accord, Pascal, Duration and
Revocability of an Offer, 1 LA. L. Rsw. 190 (1939).
171. The rule of irrevocability, in Louisiana, does not run counter to
the doctrine of consideration, as in common law. See Mouton v. Noble,
1 La. Ann. 192 (1846); accord, Smith, A Refresher Course in Cause, 12
LA. L. REV. 32-33 (1951). But see Breard v. Kanelos, 49 So.2d 451 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1950).
172. LA. CIVL COm arts. 1816, 1817, and 1818 (1870). See also id. art. 2989.
See generally 163-68 supra. See also Ryder v. Frost, 3 La. Ann. 523 (1848).
173. In dealing with a general rule to which exceptions are formulated,
the mistake should not be made of thinking that the situations governed
by exceptions will be fewer than those governed by the general rule. Quite
to the contrary, business practices and trade usages may cause the "excep-
tional" cases to be more numerous than the "regular" ones. Rules and
exceptions are strictly a conceptual matter not to be confused with gen-
erality, or rarity, of occurrence. This means that, as a matter of practical
approach, it might very well be that in more cases the contract is formed
when the acceptance is declared, or the letter posted, than when the letter
of acceptance arrives at its destination. However, because of the cogency
of concepts, it is necessary to go back to the general rule every time the
circumstances do not justify an exception.
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Louisiana courts. But at least in one case, authority is given in
support of the interpretation expressed above. 74
/ A different approach is taken by Louisiana courts in regard
to insurance contracts. In this connection, the moment of post-
ing the letter of acceptance has been taken to be the time of
contract formation. 7 5 This view, however, is not as inconsistent
with the reception, or the information theories as it at first blush
appears to be. In fact, as indicated elsewhere, 176 these theories
protect the best interest of the offeror, whenever the offeree is
already protected by the irrevocability rule. As the insured is
the offeror where a contract of insurance is about to be formed,1 "1
174. In Hanemann v. Uhry, 8 La. App. 534 (Or]. Cir. 1928), the defend,
ants, by means of a letter, offered to rent certain premises from plaintiff,
who, in his turn, accepted by the same means. The letter of acceptance
never came to the offeror's hands, on which grounds defendants argued
that their revocation of the offer was effective because it was made before
the acceptance. In entering judgment for defendants, the court asserted
that: "It nowhere appears that such acceptance was communicated to
the defendants." Id. at 535. Although It could be thought that mere posting
of the letter by plaintiff, and the fact that no revocation was received
beforehand, was not sufficient to consider the defendants bound, the case
Is not perfectly in point because plaintiff addressed the acceptance to cer-
tain real estate brokers, and not to defendants. Blanks v. Sutcliffe, 122 La.
448, 47 So. 765 (1908), was invoked by the court as a precedent although
it Is a case decided on an entirely different basis. See O'Brien, Revocatiot
of an Offer Where the Offeror Has Given the Offeree a Stated Length of
Time in Which to Accept, 5 TUL. L. Rav. 637 (1931). Some language in the
Blanks v. Sutcliffe case indicates that certain acts by plaintiff did not
constitute acceptance, but this is not the problem dealt with in the prin-
cipal case. In this case, the acceptance was communicated to a third party
who was not the offeror's agent, whereby the Hatemann case slightly
sidesteps the topic here discussed. See State ex rel. McEnery v. Nicholls,
42 La. Ann. 214, 7 So. 738, 5 La. Dig. 588 (1890).
175. Coci v. New York Life Ins. Co., 155 La. 1060, 1066, 99 So. 871, 873
(1924): "It was the completion and mailing of the contract that constituted
the delivery of the policy within the Intendment and meaning of the law.
At that time and for nearly a month prior thereto the insured was in good
health. This interpretation is sustained by the policy itself and by the
action and conduct of the company." Cf. Prult v. Great Southern Life Ins
Co., 202 La. 527, 12 So.2d 261 (1942). But see Williams v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
19 So.2d 586, 588 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1944), where Wilson v. Lewiston Mill
Co., 150 N.Y. 314, 44 N.E. 959, 55 Am.8t.Rep. 680 (1896), is quoted: "The place
where the contract Is accepted Is important. It fixes the time that the
minds of the parties met, and the contract was consummated." (Emphasis
added.) If this statement were generalized, the conclusion could be reached
that the time and place of contract formation must always coincide, as Is
the case according to the "mailbox" rule. But this Is not necessarily so
at civil law. See 191 infra. As Williams v. Travelers deals with a problem
of conflict of laws, the statement in question should be considered dictum.
176. See text accompanying note 87 supra.
177. "An application for insurance, even when accompanied by a promis-
sory note for the premium, Is an offer to enter into a contract of insurance,
which does not become a contract until it is accepted by the insurance com-
pany through someone having the authority to do so." Foster v. Morrison,
145 So. 13, 14 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1933).
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the conclusion is that the best protection of the offeror requires
that the risk be covered from the moment the insurer mails the
letter of acceptance.178 Moreover, it can very well be said that
the nature of this particular contract amply justifies the earliest
possible establishment of the contractual bond.
Finally, the reasons given in the following quotation are
noteworthy: "In the interpretation of commercial contracts, this
court will be largely influenced and guided by the law merchant
of the United States, and the construction of that law made by
the supreme court of the United States.' 179 Perhaps this state-
ment of judicial policy could be taken to mean that distinctions
should be made between civil matters proper and commercial
matters, thus opening a door to the adoption of different rules
in cases of one or the other kind. That distinction, it will be
remembered, is certainly not alien to the civilian tradition.180
The above discussion allows the following conclusions in
solving practical problems under the Louisiana law:
(a) If the letter of acceptance is delayed, or lost in the mail
and never reaches the offeror, the contract should be considered
as not having come into existence.' 8 '
(b) A letter of acceptance can be validly overtaken by a
telegram of rejection, or a letter of rejection overtaken by a
faster communication of acceptance. The offeror should be bound
by the communication that reaches him first.
(c) The contract should be considered formed at the moment
the communication of acceptance is at the offeror's disposal, and
the actual learning of its content depends solely on his own
activity. Therefore, if the offeror prevents reception of the letter,
178. Cf. Harding v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 188 So. 177 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1939); National Liberty Ins. Co. v. Police Jury, 96 F.2d 261 (5th Cir.
1938). See generally FULLER & BRAUCHER, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 283 (1964);
2 PUIG BRUTAU, FUNDAMENTOS DE DERECHO CIVIL, PART I 229-230 (1954); Pound,
The Theory of Judiciai Deciion, 36 HARV. L. REV. 945, 954 (1923). For a
general contention to the effect that the contract of life insurance is a con-
tract sui generis, see Sizeler v. Sizeler, 170 La. 128, 127 So. 388 (1930).
179. Chaffraix v. Price, 29 La. Ann. 176 (1877).
180. See, e.g., Kinsell & Locke, Inc. v. Kohlman, 12 La. App. 575, 126 So.
257 (Orl. Cir. 1930); Held v. Goldsmith, 153 La. 598, 96 So. 272 (1923). There
is, however, a contemporary trend, inaugurated by the Swiss CODE OF OBLI-
GATIONS, towards grouping together civil and commercial matter, with few
exceptions; see Houin, Reform of the French CiviZ Code and of the Code of
Commerce, 4 AM. J. COMp. LAW 485 (1955).
181. Provided, of course, it is not a case of implied acceptance, where
communication thereof is irrelevant. See LA. CIL CODE arts. 1816, 1817 (1870).
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or otherwise refuses the knowledge of it, the contract should be
considered formed.1 8 2
Where an error was committed in the transmission of a tele-
gram containing an offer, the court of appeal of Louisiana, in
Estherwood Rice Mill, Inc. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., l83
held the defendant liable for the loss incurred by the offeror who
was requested to perform according to the acceptance. It is note-
worthy, however, that in this case the parties had agreed to be
bound by the terms of the offer as received by the Commodity
Credit Corporation.184
Where a dispute arises as to the means of transmission, it
has been decided that the mail is a proper means, unless specific
instructions are given for the use of telegram. l8 5
PLACE OF CONTRACT FORMATION
The determination of the place of contract formation is of
particular importance with regard to (a) problems of venue,
and (b) problems pertaining to the law applicable in matters of
conflicts of the laws. 8 6
French Law
In French law it has been asserted, in general terms, that
the place of contract formation is that where the minds of the
182. This conclusion can be supported by generalizing the doctrine
underlying LA. CIVIL COD art. 2040 (1870); although the same, per 8,
it is not directly applicable to the situation discussed.
183. 127 So.2d 231 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
184. Notwithstanding, there is language in the decision indicating that
the court does not share the views expressed in federal case law where
the sender is not bound by an offer erroneously expressed by the telegraph
company and, therefore, cannot recover damages for an enforceable con-
tract voluntarily performed. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Cowin & Co.,
20 F.2d 103, 54 A.L.R. 1362 (8th Cir. 1927), distinguished in this decision.
In reference to the federal case, the court says: "Whatever validity this
holding might have under its own facts ....... 127 So.2d at 233. In this
connection, see also Note, Contracts-Agency of Telegraph Company as to
Negligently Changed Offer, 2 So. L.Q. 37 (1917), commenting on a North
Carolina case.
185. Vilm Milling Co. v. Guarino, 13 Orl. App. 399 (La. 1916): "An order
for the sale and delivery of flour is properly transmitted by mail, unless the
purchaser instructs that it be made by wire." The order had been placed
with plaintiff's agent, who transmitted it by mail instead of wiring it, as it
seems would have better fit defendant's' urgency. Cf. United States Cutlery
Co. v. Hawkins, 17 La. App. 395, 136 So. 127, 128 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1931)
wherein the court's actual decision was that acceptance could not be
Implied under the circumstances.
186. See, e.g., Trib. Com. Seine, July 26, 1934, D.P. 1935, 2, 12; see also 1
ENCYCLOPEDIE DALLOZ 990 (1951).
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parties actually meet. This general statement does not seem
difficult to understand when the parties are negotiating face to
face, but the scope of its meaning becomes cloudy when the
contract is between distant parties. In an attempt to formulate
a clearer statement, it has been said that the determination of
the place of contract formation depends on the moment at which
it is concluded; therefore, the contract should be considered con-
cluded at the place where the last act necessary for this con-
clusion occurs. This has brought into the picture the dispute
between the supporters of the different theories that have been
discussed in connection with the problem of the time at which
the contract is formed.181
The French jurisprudence has often supported the theory
of transmission, thereby asserting that the place at which the
contract is formed is that from which the letter of acceptance
departs, which place will, in the vast majority of cases, coincide
with the domicile of the offeree.'m
But, as often, French decisions adhered to the knowledge
theory, thereby admitting that the contract is to be considered
formed at the place where the letter of acceptance is received,
which, in the vast majority of cases, will coincide with the
offeror's domicile.189 The Cour de Cassation has repeatedly ex-
pressed the view that the question is one of fact, in the appre-
ciation of which the trial court is sovereign. This had led, many
times, to the holding that the contract is formed at the place
where the acceptance is received.1'
When the contract has been concluded through a mandatary,
broker, or intermediary, it is generally asserted that the place
of formation is that where the mandatary deals with the party
other than his principal.191 This rule does not vary even when
187. 2 CARBONNIER, DRorr CIVIL 337 (1957); 2 DEMoOut, TRAITf DES OBLIGA-
TIONs EN GONARAL 226-230 (1923); 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRArrIl PRATIQUn Do DR01T
CIVIL FRANCAIS-OBLIGATIONS-PART I 195-99 (2d ed. Esmein 1952).
188. Trib. Civ. Seine, Jan. 31, 1936, D.P. 1937, 2, 40; Paris, Dec. 21, 1916,
D. 1917, 2, 33; Trib. Seine, Oct. 26, 1913, GAz. TaRM., 1914, 2, 325; see 2
DEMOGUE, TRAITf DES OBLIGATIONS EN G]NtRAL 227 (1923).
189. Trib. Com. d'Orange, Feb. 26, 1932, Rec. GAZ. DU PALAIS, 1932, 1,
912; Aix, Dec. 23, 1908, Rec. MarseiZle, 1909, 2, 140, S. 1910, 2, 6, GAz. PAL.,
1908, 2, 577; Nimes, March 4, 1908, GAZ. Trn., March 19, 1908; Limoges, Jan.
27, 1894, GAz. Tam., 1914, 2, 183. See 2 DEMOGUE, TuITa DES OBLIGATIONS EN
GtN RAL 226 (1923).
190. Cass. Civ., Nov. 16, 1910, S. 1912, 1, 461; Cass. Civ., Jan. 5, 1877, 1,
281.
191. Caen, July 20, 1898, Rec. Rouen, 1898, 2, 226; Dijon, March 22, 1897,
D. 1898, 2, 102; Montpellier, May 4, 1889, GAZ. PAL., 1889, 2, 74. See 2 DMoouE,
TRAIT] DES OBLIATIONS EN GMN2RAL 228 (1923).
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the contract is to be ratified by the principal, for, in such cases,
a certain retroactive effect is attributed to the ratification, making
the contract valid from the day it took place, and not from the
moment it was ratified.1 9 2
It follows that French doctrine and jurisprudence adhere to
the view that, in matters of contracts by correspondence, al-
though two different places may be involved, and although the
acts leading to the formation are performed at different times,
there is one single time and one single place when and where
the contract is considered formed. Moreover, it seems that time
and place should coincide, the contract being formed at the time
and place a certain act occurs. 19 8
Common Law
Similar ideas govern this question at common law. In the
language found in the Restatement of the Law of Contracts,
section 74: "A contract is made at the time when the last act
necessary for its formation is done, and at the place where that
final act is done." In matters of contracts by telephone, section
65 of the Restatement makes such a situation similar to one
where the parties are in the presence of each other. But, in this
respect, court decisions have established that "the law is that
a contract made by telephone is entered into at the place where
the recipient of the call is at the time he accepts the offer. 1 9 4
192. Toulouse, March 27, 1884, GAz. PAL., 1884, I, 917; Montpellier, May 4,
1889, GAZ. PAL., 1889, 2, 74; contra, Cass. Civ., Dec. 23, 1902, S. 1904, I, 244.
193. 2 COLIN & CAPITANT, COURS ELUMENTAIRE D5 DRoIT CIVIL FRANgAIS 38
(10th ed. 1953); 6 PLANIOL & RIPPRT, TRArrt PRATIQUE DE Dorr CIVIL FRANgAiS-
OBLIGATIONS--PART I 183-84 (2d ed. Esmein 1952). See especially Req., March
21, 1932, D. 1933, 1, 65. In a note to this decision by Sa16 de la Marni~e,
it Is suggested that the Cour has abandoned the previous contention that
time and place of contract formation are questions of fact, and asserts
instead that the problem does not depend on the circumstances of the
case but on the Interpretation of a suppletory rule of law of general
character. In the same note, a more functional approach is outlined, based
on the idea of risk. In German law, adherence to the reception, or the
information, theories implies the solution to the problem of the place of
contract formation. However, detailed provisions in the ZIVLPROZmSSORDNUNC
(German Code of Civil Procedure) arts. 29 and 603 should be taken into
account in order to determine venue; also B.G.B. arts. 269 and 270, which
regulate the place of performance.
194. Ward Mfg. Co. v. Miley, 281 P.2d 343 (Cal. App. 2d Cir. 1955). See
1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 82A, at 272 (1957). Where a contract by teletype
was involved, it was held that the place of formation was that where the
acceptance was received, as if the parties were face to face. Entore, Ltd. v.
Miles Far East Corp., 3 W.L.R. 48 (C-A.), 2 All E.R. 493 (1955).
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Louisiana Law
In Louisiana, although the law never contained a rule
similar to Article 420 of the French Code of Civil Procedure,
the adoption of the Anglo-American concept of venue and the
discarding of French procedural concepts 95 eliminated the im-
portance which in French law is attributed to the place of con-
tract formation in order to determine competence ratione per-
sonae.196 The importance of the place is, therefore, confined to
matters of jurisdiction, and law applicable from the viewpoint
of conflicts. In this connection, it has been clearly established
that if goods are ordered from England, the contract is governed
by the English law, and that if no privileges are given there, no
privilege will be allowed here.197 A contract of insurance is
governed by the laws of the place in which it was concluded.198
Where the law of the place where the owner resides differs from
the law of the place where the contract of affreightment is
formed, the latter governs. 9
ACCEPTANCE IN COMPLIANCE WITH TEEMs OF OFFER
In order to create a valid contract, the acceptance must
conform to the terms of the offer; otherwise it would amount
to a counter-proposition.
In French law this clear accord is confined to the essential
terms, which are determined for each kind of contract either
by law or court decisions. 200 Thus, in matters of sale, the con-
tract is perfect upon consent of the parties on the thing and
the price.201 Therefore, no contract of sale would ever result
if there is no accord as to the object and the price. But, when
those two essential elements are agreed upon, a contract of sale
is formed, even in the absence of any provision as to the time
of payment, term of delivery, or any other stipulations con-
195. See McMahon, INTRODUCTION TO ClVIL PROCEDURE, COURSE OUTLINES AND
SELECTED READINGS, PART III 4 (Unpublished).
196. See, in this connection, LA. CODE OF PRACTICE arts. 13, 86, 162, 166
(1870), and LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 42 (1961).
197. Whiston v. Stodder, 8 Mart.(O.S.) 95 (1820).
198. Shiff v. Louisiana State Ins. Co., 6 Mart.(N.S.) 629 (1828). See also
Shreveport v. New York Life Ins. Co., 141 La. 360, 75 So. 80 (1917): "The
contract of life insurance is completed at the place where the policy is
delivered and the first premium collected."
199. Malpica v. McKown, 1 La. 248 (1830).
200. See 2 DEmOGUE, TRAITI DES OBLIGATIONS EN GI§NtRAL 233 (1923).
201. Art. 1583 of the FRENCH CIvIL CODE. similar to LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2456
(1870).
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sidered non-essential. 20 2 In matters of lease, the thing, the price,
and the term of duration are essential, 208 but the lack of a stipu-
lation as to time of payment of the rent is not material.204 The
different aspects not expressly regulated by the parties in their
contract are subject to the solutions contained in the Code Napo-
leon for each particular contractual situation, or, in the absence
of code solutions, to the general rules on interpretation of con-
tracts.
205
But the absence of an express stipulation of the parties on
a certain point should not be confused with their disagreement
on an apparently non-essential stipulation.20 6 In situations of
202. Montpellier, Feb. 11, 1909, Mon. du Midi, June 6, 1909; Req., Dec. 31,
1900, S. 1901, I, 407, Pand ft., 1901, I, 286; Lyon, May 13, 1885, GAz. PAL.,
1885, 2, supp, 134. See generally 2 DEMOGUE, TRAITL DES OBLIGATIONS EN
GhNgRAL 234 (1923).
203. CODE NAPOLEON art. 1709, similar to LA. CIVrI CODE art. 2674 (1870);
Montpellier, Feb. 3, 1896, GAZ. PAL., 1896, I, 756; Trib. Seine, July 15, 1895,
GAZ. PAL., 1894, 2, 682.
204. Besanqon, Dec. 16, 1903, GAz. PAL., 1904, I, 232. In a contract of
partnership, the term of duration is considered essential: Lyon, June 24,
1870, S. 1871, 2, 70.
205. Article 1159 of the CODE NAPOLEON, similar to LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1953
(1870); Trib. Seine, May 3, 1913, GAz. TRIB., 1913, 2, 171. See generally 2
DEMOGUE, TRAIT15 DES OBLIGATIONS EN GPNAlRAL 235 (1923).
206. 2 DEMOGUE, TRAITA DES OBLIGATIONS EN GPNtlRAL 236, 238-39 (1923).
At common law, this topic is discussed under the heading "indefiniteness."
It is now recognized that the requirement of definiteness cannot be carried
too far. In Merchants' Bank of Canada v. Sims, 122 Wash. 106, 112, 209
Pac. 1113, 1115 (1922), the court said: "Upon the question of uncertainty
or indefiniteness, it will be admitted, as contended by the appellant, that
a contract to be enforceable Uiust be reasonably certain as to its terms and
duration." See also Haggerty v. Warner, 115 Cal. App. 2d 468, 472, 252 P.2d
373, 375 (1953): "The trend of recent decisions indicates a policy of uphold-
ing contracts if a reasonable construction may be reached that the inten-
tion of the parties was mutually understood and readily may be ascer-
tained." At civil law, the solution to this problem is clearer because of the
detailed regulation of contracts in particular to be generally found In
civil codes, such as in Book III, Titles VI through XX, of the Louisiana
Civil Code. These regulations contain provisions suppletory of the parties'
will, which means that, unless otherwise agreed on by the parties, they
will be presumed to subject their contract to the suppletory code provi-
sions. Thus, it can be said that, at civil law, there is less occasion for
indefiniteness, as the requirement of definiteness is limited to the essentials
of the contract. At any rate, the preceding quotations from decisions show
that contemporary common law seems oriented likewise through elabora-
tion by the courts. In this connection, the provision contained in UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-204(3) (1962) is noteworthy: "Even though one or more
terms are left open a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if
the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably
certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy." Clearly, this provision Is
not incompatible with the traditional civilian approach reflected in LA. CIVIL
CODE art. 2456 (1870). On "indefiniteness," see generally GRISMORE, CONTRACTS
§ 25 (1965).
The same comment can be made on the ways civil and common law
approach the problem of additional terms implicit In a proposition. At
early common law, when a statement was put in writing, the view was
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII
the latter kind, the parties' intent will be carefully explored and,
if it is found that one of them considered the point material,
such a disagreement will prevent the formation of the contract.
If, however, the offer contains various terms, the acceptance,
to be effective, must comply with all of them regardless of
whether they are essential or not.207
The same detailed compliance with the terms of the offer
is required of the acceptance at common law.208 The offeree
cannot make any changes or introduce qualifications or condi-
tions of the slightest kind.209 If this takes place, no contract
will be consummated by the purported acceptance, but it will
amount to a counter-offer. Thus, if the offer states the time,
place, or manner of acceptance, there must be compliance or
no valid contract will be formed.2 10
that nothing could be added to the writing by Implication. Modern deci-
sions have taken a more liberal attitude. In Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-
Gordon, 322 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917), the court held: "It Is true that
he [the plaintiff] does not promise in so many words that he will use
reasonable efforts to place the defendant's indorsements and market her
designs. We think, however, that such a promise is fairly to be Implied.
The law has outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when the precise
word was the sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal. It takes a
broader view today. A promise may be lacking, and yet the whole writing
may be 'instinct with an obligation' imperfectly expressed." See also
Robinson v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 363, 366 (1871); Kelsy v.
Puckett, 198 Iowa 839, 200 N.W. 421 (1924). See generally GRISMORE, CON-
TRACTS § 23, at 27-29 (1965). In the civilian approach, the solution is easily
reached through the rule contained in LA. Cnui CODE art. 1903 (1870). As to
other implied conditions at civil law, see Lalance Grosjean Mfg. Co. v.
Wolff, 28 La. Ann. 942 (1876): The dissolving condition is implied in all
sales for non-payment of the price, is peculiar to the civil law, and does
not exist in the common law. See LA. CIvIL CODE arts. 2046 and 2561 (1870).
207. 2 DEMOGUE, TRAITh DES OBLIGATIONS EN GhNARAL 233 (1923); 6 PLANIOL &
RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIV FRANgAIS-OBLIGATIONS-PART I 160 (2d
ed. Esmein 1952).
208. See generally GiSMORE, CONTRACTS § 49 (1965); RESTATEMENT, CON-
TRACTS § 59 (1932): "Except as this rule is qualified by §§ 45, 63, 72, an
acceptance must comply exactly with the requirements of the offer,
omitting nothing from the promise or performance requested." Id. at § 60:
"A reply to an offer, though purporting to accept it, which adds qualifica-
tions or requires performance of conditions, is not an acceptance but is
a counter-offer." RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONTRACTS § 59: "An acceptance
must comply with the requirements of the offer as to the promise to be
made or the performance to be rendered." Id. at § 60: "A reply to an
offer which purports to accept it but is conditional on the offeror's assent
to terms additional to or different from those offered is not an acceptance
but Is a counter-offer."
209. Gribbs v. Oak, 164 Neb. 296, 82 N.W.2d 410 (1957).
210. Wheeling, O. & E. R.R. v. Wheeling Coal R.R., 94 W.Va. 536,
119 S.E. 551 (1923); Home v. Niver, 168 Mass. 4, 46 N.E. 393 (1897); RESTATE-
MENT, CONTRACTS § 61 (1932): "If an offer prescribes the place, time or
manner of acceptance Its terms in this respect must be complied with
in order to create a contract. If an offer merely suggests a permitted
place, time or manner of acceptance, another method of acceptance is not
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An interesting provision is contained in section 2-206 (b)
of the Uniform Commercial Code: "An order or other offer to
buy goods for prompt or current shipment shall be construed
as inviting acceptance either by a prompt promise to ship or
by the prompt or current shipment of conforming or non-con-
forming goods, but such a shipment of non-conforming goods
does not constitute an acceptance if the seller seasonably noti-
fies the buyer that the shipment is offered only as an accom-
modation to the buyer." The shipment of such "non-conforming
goods," according to the comment following the section, will
complete the contract and, simultaneously constitute a breach
by the seller.21'
The law of Louisiana responds, in this matter, to the same
precluded." However, where a promise is requested in return for a promise,
the RESTATEMENT allows the performance itself as sufficient, without insist-
ing that the offeree make the promise. See 4d. at § 63: "If an offer
requests a promise from the offeree, and the offeree without making the
promise actually does or tenders what he was requested to promise or
do, there is a contract, subject to the rule stated in § 56, provided such
performance is completed or tendered within the time allowable for accept-
ing by making a promise. A tender in such a case operates as a promise
to render complete performance." But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONTRACTS
§ 63: "(1) Where an offer invites an offeree to choose between acceptance
by promise and acceptance by performance, the beginning of the invited
performance or a tender of part of it is an acceptance by performance.
(2) Such an acceptance operates as a promise to render complete per-
formance." The offeree may ask that some terms be changed without
thereby invalidating his acceptance; see RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 62 (1932):
"An acceptance which requests a change or addition to the terms of the
offer is not thereby invalidated unless the acceptance is made to depend
on an assent to the changed or added terms." See, e.g., Rucker v. Sanders,
182 N.C. 607, 109 S.E. 857 (1921); Skinner v. Stone, 144 Ark. 353, 222 S.W.
360 (1920); Horgan v. Russell, 24 N.D. 490, 140 N.W. 99, 43 L.R.A. 1150
(1913). See generally GRisMORE, CONTRACTS § 49, at 73 (1965). In the same
connection, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-207 (1962) is noteworthy: "(1) A
definite and reasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation
which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even
though it states terms additional to or different from those offered or
agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent
to the additional or different terms. (2) The additional terms are to be
construed as proposals for addition to the contract. Between merchants
such terms become part of the contract unless: (a) the offer expressly
limits acceptance to the terms of the offer; (b) they materially alter it;
or (c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is
given within a reasonable time after notice of them is received."
211. In comment 4, it is suggested that such "non-conforming" goods
would be a shipment referable to the order, but with a defect. This
provision can be understood only against the background of previous
deals between the parties that would justify the offeror in taking the
acceptance for granted, or place the offeree under duty to communicate
his rejection of the offer to prevent Injury to the offeror's interest. Only
assuming this peculiar duty to accept on the part of the offeror is it
justifiable to think that the shipment of non-conforming goods will con-
stitute acceptance, and breach of contract at the same time, as described
in the comment.
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general principle. To form a contract, the acceptance must be
in all things conformable to the offer; any condition or limita-
tion contained in the acceptance gives the offeror the right to
revoke.212 The modification or change of the proposition is con-
sidered as a new offer, and the party making it is bound by the
acceptance as if the original proposition had been made by
him.213
Thus, it has been decided that there can be no acceptance
of a written contract with variations, or subject to conditions
or modifications unagreed to by the other party, since, to
create a contract, the minds of the parties must meet.2 14 An
acceptance conditioned upon settlement of a deceased's succes-
sion has been held not binding.2 15 But, in contracts where the
promisor agrees to pay for goods or labor, "provided he is satis-
fied," the obligation is binding.21 6 The rule that the acceptance
must be identical with the offer to constitute a contract has
received invariable application by Louisiana courts.217 If the
offer is rejected, it cannot be revived by subsequent accept-
ance.
218
As to the question of the terms which an offer must com-
prise in order for the acceptance to conclude a contract, the
French views about discussed are perfectly applicable in Lou-
isiana, especially because of the clear provisions of Louisiana
Civil Code Article 1764.219
It is noteworthy to consider whether a provision such as
the above-quoted section 2-206 (b) of the UCC can be deemed
212. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1805 (1870).
213. Id. art. 1806.
214. Connell v. Hill, 30 La. Ann. 251 (1878); Bethel v. Hawkins, 21 La.
Ann. 620 (1869); cf. McDonough v. Winchester, 1 La. 188 (1830).
215. Vordenbaumen v. Gray, 189 So. 342 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939).
216. Planters' Cotton Oil Co. v. Klumpp, Orl. App. No. 7684 (La. App.
1920).
217. Fontenont v. Huguet, 230 La. 483, 89 So.2d 45 (1956); International
Paper Co. v. Rivers, 35 So.2d 677 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1948); Blythe v. Hall, 169
La. 1120, 1121, 126 So. 679 (1930): "An offer must be accepted as made to
constitute a contract"; Mosely v. Red River Oil Mill, 6 La. App. 725 (2d Cir.
1927); Cottam & Co. v. Gonzales, 5 La. App. 171 (1st Cir. 1926); Elver v. Hart,
121 La. 537, 46 So. 619 (1908); Barrow v. Ker, 10 La. Ann. 120 (1855).
218. Wolf v. Rogers, 6 Rob. 97 (1843): An offer to contract must be
obligatory, be accepted in toto, if declined it is at an end and cannot be
revived by a subsequent assent. Where a parish rejected all bids submitted
and asked for new bids, the second bids being also rejected, and parish then
attempted to accept plaintiff's original bid with modifications, it was held
that the offer had never been accepted and the plaintiff was entitled to the
return of his deposit. Worthington Const. Co. v. Parish of Jefferson Davis,
142 La. 659, 77 So. 492 (1918).
219. See 28 LA. L. REv. 1, 11-13 (1967).
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compatible with the Louisiana law. At first impression, a ship-
ment of non-conforming goods could not constitute acceptance
in the terms of Article 1805. However, a series of transactions
between the same parties may justify the offeror in taking the
acceptance for granted, which gives rise to the offeree's duty
to communicate his rejection to the offeror.220 This view, sup-
ported in other jurisdictions, is perfectly compatible with the
civilian tradition, and also compatible with the Louisiana Civil
Code due to the importance attributed to the circumstances of
the case in Article 1809. Taking this into account, and reading
in context Articles 1805, 1809, and 1816, whenever the circum-
stances allow the acceptance to be taken for granted, the offeree
who ships non-conforming goods is violating the contract he is
presumed to have entered for not having given notice of rejec-
tion. The manifestation that shipment is made as an accommo-
dation to the buyer might very well be taken as such a notice,
thereby releasing him from contractual liability.
CRossIm OFFERS
When two concurring propositions cross In the mail, French
doctrine generally admits that a contract Is formed. In support
of this view it has been said that, as one of the parties is willing
to contract, there is agreement at the moment the other party
knows of that will and accepts. Partisans of the reception or
knowledge theories suggest that the contract is formed at the
moment the letter arriving last is received. The supporters of
the declaration, or transmission theories, instead, assert that the
contract is formed at the moment the second declaration takes
place.22 1
If there is no accord as to the sum involved in the trans-
action, as for instance, if the buyer offers one hundred, and the
seller quotes ninety, there is a contract on the lesser amount.
A logical explanation cannot be given in support of this view,
but it has been advanced that, in the first place, there is a social
interest in promoting the formation of contracts, and, in the
second place, their formation in the less onerous conditions
should be favored.222
A contrary view prevails at common law. It has been de-
220. See 175 supra.
221. See generally 2 DsMoouE, TRmbrA DEs OBLIATIONS BN G*NI RAL 237
(1923).
222. Id.
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cided that where two offers identical in terms cross in the mail
there is no contract.223 This holding is consistent with the theory
that a contract is formed only when one party "has been induced
to accept and rely upon the promise of another. '224 It also con-
firms the current view that an offer is ineffective until re-
ceived.225 But, at any rate, there can be no doubt that each offer
creates a power of acceptance in the other party who may close
the deal by accepting it, thereby making the contract each of
them offered to make.2 26
The Louisiana Civil Code follows, in this matter, the conti-
nental tradition, and, affirming the prevalence of the parties'
will, provides that there is a contract in the case of crossing
offers. However, a better reason is given for this in Article 1807:
"When, however, from the circumstances of the case, the
offer necessarily implies an assent to the modification of
the acceptance, then the obligation is complete, although
there be a difference in terms between the one and the other.
If, for example, one offers to sell a certain article for one
hundred dollars, and the other, not having yet received the
offer, should on his part propose to give two hundred dollars,
the proposal to give the greater sum necessarily implies an
assent to take it for a less, and the contract is complete at
the lowest sum." (Emphasis added.)
But if what is offered is of a different nature from what is
requested, or if any modification to the terms of the offer is
introduced, then no contract will result, even when what is
offered is of greater value or the sum to be paid for a different
term is larger.2
27
223. Tlnn v. Hoffmann & Co., 29 L.T. (N.S.) 271 (1873). Contra, Morris
Asinoff & Sons v. Freudenthal, 195 App. Div. 79, 186 N.Y.S. 383, af'd 135 N.E.
919, 233 N.Y. 564 (1921), although the facts of this case are rather peculiar,
and do not conform entirely with the hypothesis in the text. RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS § 24 (1932) is also invoked as lending support to this view. How-
ever, a different result could, perhaps, be predicated on RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND), CONTRACTS § 24: "An offer is the manifestation of willingness to enter
into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that
his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it."
224. 1 CORSIN, CONTRACTS § 59, at 183 (1950).
225. 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 35, at 96 (1957).
226. 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 59, at 184 (1950). Blackburn, J., in Tinn v.
Hoffmann & Co., 29 L.T. (N.S.) 271 (Eng. 1873): "Either of the parties may
write and say, 'I accept your offer, and, as you perceive, I have already made
a similar offer to you,' and then people would know what they were about;
I think either side might revoke."
227. LA. CImI CODE art. 1808 (1870): "But a consent to give anything else,
although of a greater value than that contained in the offer, or to give the
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A question can be raised when the difference in the propo-
sitions crossing in the mail is not on the price, but on the quan-
tity of the things which are the subject matter of the contract.
If one party offers to sell ten units, and the other party offers
to buy eight, is there a contract? Several opinions have voiced
a negative answer. However, prestigious French writers are of
the view that in this problem also the formation of contracts
should be favored and, therefore, a contract should be deemed
concluded on the lesser quantity, unless it is clear that the
vendor, for instance, was only interested in the sale of the whole
amount. Such an interest could be reasonably implied if whole-
sale sales is his habitual business.228 This is the view adopted
by French jurisprudence, thus allowing the possibility for a
partial acceptance to be valid.
2 9
DAMAGES FOR REJECTION OF OFFER
An interesting question, subject to considerable debate in
continental law, is whether the rejection of a proposition can
give rise to damages.
As a matter of principle, the one to whom a proposition is
addressed is free to reject it. But the rejection should not be
made in such a way as to cause an injury to the proposer's
interest.28 0 This would be the case, for instance, when the rejec-
tion is accompanied by unwarranted publicity, which would con-
stitute a fault whereby damages could be recovered.
23 1
The rejection of an offer, or a refusal to contract giving rise
to a claim of indemnity, was considered by the Cour de Cassa-
tion in connection with labor law matters. It was decided that
the mere fact of refusing to hire unionized labor did not con-
stitute fault per se, but it could take place under such circum-
stances that the refusal would become a source of indemnifiable
same or a larger sum at a different term of payment, does not imply an
assent to the offer, and there Is in that case no obligation."
228. 2 DEMOGUE, TRAITa DES OBLIGATIONS EN G2NARAL 283 (1923); 3 LYoN-
CAEN & RENAULT, TRAIT2 DE DROIT COMMERCIAL no 23 (1923).
229. Paris, June 30, 1920, S.1921,2,4. See 6 PLANIOL & RIPEST, TsArr PRA-
TIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS-OBLIGATIONS-PART I 160 (2d ed. Esmein 1952).
230. See 2 DEMOGUE, TRAITS§ DES OBLIGATIONS EN GAN1§RAL 196 (1923).
231. Trib. Seine, Jan. 8, 1907, D.1907,5,22. The Socit~d d'encouragement
pour 'amelioration du cheval frangais de demi-sang denied a jockey a
license to ride on Its private race tracks; the court concluded that the
sociWtd did not Incur any liability thereby, as no damaging publicity attended
the refusal.
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damage.23 2 This solution has been approached as an instance of
the application of the abus de droit theory, as it is assumed that
the employer is acting out of the sole intention of preventing
the union from recruiting members. 233 It would be otherwise if
the employer can justify his attitude because of strikes or other
conflicts provoked by members of that union. The court must,
in such a case, proceed to a very careful evaluation of the facts.23 4
The kind of damages to be awarded in a situation of this
sort has also been subject to discussion. One portion of French
doctrine supports the view that only the protection of the nega-
tive contractual interest should be granted.23 5 The more pres-
tigious writers, however, are of the view that the positive
interest should be protected and indemnity granted for the
whole frustrated expectation.236 Thus, it is said, the court should
consider the worker's probability of securing another employ-
ment, and, if he does, the focus should be on the greater ad-
vantages the laborer would have derived from a job with the
rejecting employer.23 7 French courts, however, are reluctant to
grant assessments of this kind, and they usually award punitive
or exemplary damages.28s
Another problem that invited preoccupation of French doc-
232. Req., March 13, 1905, D.1906,I,11& Accord, 2 DEMoGUE, TRAI A Do
OBuGATIONS EN GANtRAL 196 (1923).
233. Aix, Dec. 21, 1910, D.1911,2,385, with a note by Planiol. See also Trib.
Cor. D'Eperney, Feb. 28, 1906, Trib. Civ. De Lille, Nov. 12, 1906, and Lyon,
Jan. 23, 1907, all reported in D.1908,2,73, with note by Louis Josserand where
other instances of rejection giving rise to damages on grounds of abus de
droit are considered.
Vhen an insurance agent has a contractual right to appoint his successor
to the position, the insurance company cannot systematically refuse all the
agent's propositions and make the final appointment by itself. Paris, July 3,
1913, GAZ. PAL., 1913,2,177. The licensee for the manufacturing of certain ap-
pliances cannot refuse to sell parts thereof to whoever shall offer to buy
them. Lyon, Dec. 11, 1908, GAZ. COMM. LYON, Dec. 15, 1909.
234. 2 DEMOOum, TRAIT. DES OBLIGATIONS EN Gj§NaRAL 197 (1923). In Morel,
Du Refus de Contracter en Ratson de Considerations Personnelles, REvuE DE
DROIT CIVIL 299-308 (1908), it is suggested that a distinction should be made
whether the person rejecting the offer had remained heretofore inactive, or
had invited the offer. Only in the latter case would it be proper to speak of
frustrated reliance and damages may, therefore, derive. But this suggestion
has remained alien to French jurisprudence, according to which abus du
droit may lie in silence or inactivity. Accord, 2 DEMOOUE, Id. at 198.
235. Morel, Du Refus, de Contractor en Ratson do Considerations Per-
sonnelles, REvuE DE DROIT CIvm 299-308 (1908).
236. 2 DEMoGUz, TRAITA DES OBLIGATIONS EN GIN5RAL 198 (1923).
237. Id.
238. Id. At common law, to refuse to contract under the same circum-
stances is not a tort, but It is different under federal statutory authority;
see National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (8)(a)(3). See Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
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trine is whether liability could arise because of the interruption
of negotiations,239 or, in other words, whether either of the
negotiating parties incurs any liability at all before a definite
offer is formulated. The conclusion has been reached that such
a situation may engender liability, but only when, on account
of the circumstances, the abrupt abandonment of the negotia-
tions is accompanied by fault. The existence of fault in cases of
this sort should be admitted with great caution in order not to
deprive the parties of their freedom to bargain and decide until
the moment of the offer and the acceptance. 240 There is fault,
however, when the party who gives up the negotiations, having
already accepted a concurring proposition, allowed the one with
whom he was negotiating to incur research expenses in prepara-
tion of his offer.241 There is fault also when the interruption is
considered an unfair or disloyal practice, according to the
usages of commerce.242
DUTY TO ACCEPT OFM
In German doctrine and jurisprudence, it is asserted that,
under certain circumstances, there is a duty to accept a propo-
sition. This duty may derive from a preliminary contract be-
tween the same parties, as when they enter into an agreement
to conclude a final contract later on, provided all the require-
ments are present and the subject matter of the principal con-
tract has been clearly agreed upon in the preliminary one.
243
239. See 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAIT4 PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRAN9AIS--
OBLIGATIONS-PART I 154-165 (2d. Esmein 1952). Negotiations leading up to a
contract are called pourparlers in French; for a Thdorie gdndrale des
pourparlers, see 2 DEMOGUE, TRA1T DES OBLIGATIONS EN G2N2RAL 166-171 (1923).
See also Saleilles, De la Responsabilitd Prdcontractuelle, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE
697 (1907); Fagella, Fondamento della Responsabilita in Tema di Trattative
Contrattuali, 1 ARCHivo GiRuIeICo 128-150 (1909).
240. 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAITA PRATIQUE DE Daorr CIVIL FRANgAIS-OBLIGA-
TIONS-PART I 155 (2d ed. Esmeln 1952).
241. See, e.g., Civ., Jan. 4, 1937, Rev. des soc., 1937,117. Cf. Req., Oct. 19,
1931, D.H.1931,540; Rennes, July 8, 1929, D.H.1929,548. Accord, 6 PLANIOL &
RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DR DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS-OBLIGATIONS-PART I 155 (2d
ed. Esmein 1952).
242. See 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRArnt PRATIQUR DR] DR0IT CIVIL FRANgAIS-
OBLIGATIONS-PART I 155 (2d ed. Esmein 1952). See generally the following
recent French decisions: Cass. Civ. I, Feb. 27, 1962, J.C.P. 62, IV, 6d. G., 54;
Bull. Civ. I, no 127, p. 113; Cass. Cor., July 1, 1959, BuHl. Civ. III, no 296, p.
259. In both cases, precontractural liability is characterized as quasi-delictual.
243. Although the B.G.B. does not regulate preliminary contracts, Ger-
man jurisprudence has accepted their validity: 81 R.G.Z. 135 (1913); 78
R.G.Z. 387 (1912); 66 R.G.Z. 120 (1907). See I ENNECCERUS-NIPPERDEY, ALLGE-
MEINER TEIL, LEHRBUCH DES BURGERLICHEN RECHTS, PART II 686-687 (1955).
Cf. Mermelstein v. Schwab, 64 So.2d 37 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1953): Where
parties make a preliminary agreement which deals with the subject matter
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By special statutory provisions, certain concerns such as
telegraph companies and railroads are placed under a duty to
accept offers to contract from consumers.244 According to local
ordinances and police regulations, pharmacies, meatshops, and
taxi operators, for instance, cannot refuse to accept offers to
buy, or to utilize their services, from the general public. 24
Under emergency conditions created by war, landowners can
be charged with a duty to let vacant premises, or employers
charged with a similar duty to hire veterans.2 4
SOCIAL AGREEMENTS
As in the case of the offer, where not every proposition
amounts to a real offer, not every manifestation of a certain
willingness to accept a proposition constitutes a valid acceptance.
Words of acceptance may be spoken in a social setting with the
intent of concluding a social agreement, or a family arrange-
ment rather than perfecting an enforceable contract. Thus, if
a nonprofessional musician accepts a proposition to perform in
a charity concert, or an artist assents to an invitation to send
one of his paintings to a show, the courts must determine wheth-
er, according to the circumstances, the parties intended to create
a legal relationship. 247
In German doctrine, several attempts have been made to
draw a line between legal relations and relations arising out
of acts of mere sociability. One writer drew the line between
protected and nonprotected interests.248 Another, along the defi-
niteness of the engagement, such as when what is accepted
in a general way and provides that essential details shall be elaborated in
and defined by a later instrument, they are not bound to give assent in the
formal instrument to anything to which they have not already consented,
either expressly or by implication, in the preliminary agreement.
244. Public Act of 1871 regulating the operation of the Post Office, § 3;
Public Act of 1892 regulating telegraphs, § 5; GERMAN CODE OF COMMERCE
453 (1861). See generally 1 ENNECCERUS-NIPPERDEY, ALLoEMEINER TELL, LEHR-
BUCH DES B3URGERLICHEN RECHTS, PART II 687 (1955).
245. 1 ENNECCERUS-NIPPERDEY, ALLGEMEINER TEL, LEHRBUCH DES BURGER-
LICHEN REcHTS, PART II 687 (1955).
246. Id.
247. See 2 DEMOGUE, TRAITt DES OBLIGATIONS EN G]NARAL 203-205 (1923).
The acceptance, by one of the principal editors of a magazine, of an article
sent by the writer in view of its publication, does not imply an obligation
on the part of the magazine, as only the editorial board could decide what
materials deserve publication: Trib. Seine, July 9, 1910, D.1912,2,391. For
obligations that may derive from an invitation to a party, see Just. de pa4x
de Gosselies, Sept. 5, 1891, Journ. Trib., 1891,1231.
248. 2 VON IHERING, OEUVRES CuoIsiEs 192 (1893). See also 2 WINDSCHEID,
LEHRBUCH DES PANDEKTENREEcHT 4 (1900).
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relates to the ways in which the other party earns his living.249
But it cannot be said that a convincing criterion has been yet
formulated.
The Civil Code of Louisiana, in Article 1815, seems to adopt
a subjective approach to this problem. However, a reading of
Article 1799 shows that objective considerations are brought
into this picture also. This article states a legal presumption
that each party confers upon the other the right to judically
enforce the performance of the agreement; but the presumption
gives way whenever a contrary intent has been expressed, or
may be implied. When a contrary intent is express, the parties
do not enter a contract, but a mere social agreement. When such
a contrary intent can be said to be implied, it will thus be im-
plied in the objective circumstances of the case. At any rate,
custom and usage will play an important role in the interpreta-
tion of the circumstances.
When the relation the parties have entered into cannot be
said to be an enforceable contract, but an agreement of socia-
bility, they cannot be held liable on a contract, but they can
always incur a quasi-delictual liability, whenever a manifesta-
tion of acceptance can reasonably mislead the other party to
his detriment.250
"CoNTRACTs OF ADHEsION"
Not always are contracts formed through a process of nego-
tiation and bargaining. Necessities of modern life have gradually
developed a kind of contract one of the parties to which is not
free to bargain. This takes place when a concern or enterprise
carries out its operation through a very large number of con-
tracts entered into with any number of co-contractants, such
as public utility companies, railroads, or insurance companies.
In fact, the consumer is in no bargaining position at all when
applying for power for his home or buying a railroad ticket.
The offer of those furnishing the services adopts the form of
a take it or leave it proposition, and the acceptance, therefore,
249. Kohler, Das Obligationsinteresse, 12 ARcHrv FUR BtURGERLICHES RECHT
(1897).
250. See generally 2 DEMOOUm, TRAIT DES OBLIGATioNS EN GANWRAL 204
(1923) on the applicability of article 1382 of the CODS NAaoLcoN, similar to
IA. CIVIL CODE art. 2315 (1870), to this kind of case.
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is nothing but total submission to all the conditions stipulated
by the other party.251
In situations of this sort there is a manifest imbalance be-
tween the parties, as one of them wields unquestionably more
power than the other. The less powerful party is left with no
choice other than to adhere to the proposed terms-"contracts
of adhesion"--a formula coined by a prominent French writer.252
Contracts of this kind are usually contained in standard
forms, as the volume of business transacted by such concerns
practically demands. Printed clauses in those contracts, some-
,times small print clauses, 258 have presented difficulties of inter-
pretation. This is a problem of acceptance, as the real question
is whether the one making use of the services actually con-
sented to all the printed terms.2
Several approaches have been proposed in continental doc-
trine. In one, a contract of this kind is treated exactly as any
other one, and the presumption should be that the consumer is
free to consent to all the terms of the proposition. If he accepts
it, he accepts the whole and should be held to it. 255 As in this
approach the alleged freedom is nothing but a freedom to submit
leading to unfair solutions, it was succeeded by another view
in which a distinction between essential and necessary stipu-
251. See CommIN, CoNT'rc'rs § 1376 (1952). Some German writers suggest
that no contract, in the true sense of the word, is involved In this kind of
situation, and propose a theory of "intersocietal contracts" in order to ex-
plain It. See Nirk, Rechts-ergleichendes zur Haftung fur culpa in con-
trahendo, 18 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT
310-355 (1953). Accord, 1 PUIG BRUTAU, ESTUDIOS DE J)ERECHO COMPARADO, PART
11 79 (1951).
252. SAIanzs, Ds LA DkCLARATION Ds VOLONTS 229 (1901). See also Dreux,
Mature Jurid4que du Contrat d'Adhdslon, RsvuE os DROIT CIVIL 503 (1910).
253. The expression "fine print" refers to clauses-generally exculpatory
-so printed that It is difficult for the other party to read and understand
them; In other words, the "tucking the clause away in a mass of unim-
portant matter." See Note, Contract clauses in Fine Print, 63 HARV. L. REV.
494 (1950). Clauses printed in this way are to be found not only in contracts
of the kind described in the text, but also in contracts of a more common
nature, such as a sale. The "fine print" clause, however, more likely than
not, will appear in a standard form. Provisions of this kind are effective
only If they are actually called to the attention of the other party to the
negotiation, or when this party may be reasonably believed to have been
made aware of them. See CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 33 (1952).
254. Contra, In matters of insurance only, Foster v. Morrison, 145 So. 13
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1933).
255. See 2 Dsmoous, TRArh DE S OBLIGATIONS RN G.NARAL 309-311 (1923);
04-v., Feb. 14, 1921, S.22,1,102. See also Perreau, Clauses Manuscrites et Clauses
mpri rdes, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE 303 (1927); 6 PLANOL & RIPERT, TRAIT PaA-
TIQUs DH DRO1T CIVIL FRANgAIS--OBLIGATIONS-PART I 139 (2d ed. Esmein 1952).
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lations was recommended. The parties should be strictly held
to the essential ones, but the accessory stipulations, usually in
print, ought to be interpreted always in favor of the party who
adhered to the terms of the other, in other words, the weaker
party.2 56
This second approach was not satisfactory either, and was
soon replaced by a theory where the importance of the public
service was stressed. This view found support in the French
doctrinal development called thdorie de l'institution,27 on the
basis of which it was asserted that a certain institution is
developed for the satisfaction of a public need, thus warranting
that standard contracts be interpreted in a way consistent with
the better performance of the services. The interpretation, thus,
should favor those clauses enabling the operator to carry out
the performance of the public service under the best of condi-
tions of order, and security for its interest.
25
Finally, as a result of a more thorough analysis, the fol-
lowing conclusions have been reached:
(a) These contracts are usually concluded within the field
of an activity regulated by a public act.2 59
(b) When the standard contract conforms to the pattern
established in the act, all its clauses are binding.260
(c) Wide publicity should be given to the terms of these
contracts so that any person entering into it can be presumed
to know the terms he is accepting, even if he is illiterate.
28
'
256. 2 DOMOoUE, TRAIT DES OBLIGATIONS EN GPNPRAL 311 (1923). CI. Brooke
v. Louisiana State Ins. Co., 4 Mart.(N.S.) 640 (La. 1826): "In a policy of
insurance, the written controls the printed part." But see Wallace v. Ins. Co.,
4 La. 289 (1832): "The rule that the written governs the printed part of the
policy can only be applied where the two so contradict each other as to
make it necessary that one must yield." Cotton Bros. Cypress Co. v. Home
Ins. Co., 147 La. 308, 84 So. 792 (1920): "The written stipulation in a policy
of insurance should control when irreconcilable with those which are printed,
but that rule is qualified by the fundamental principle, applicable to all
contracts, that they should be construed, if possible, as to give effect to all
of their stipulations, and strike none with nullity." See also Lake Arthur
Dredging Co. v. Mechanics Ins. Co., 162 La. 1090, 111 So. 466 (1927).
257. HAURIOU, PRINCIPES DE Dsorr PUBLIC 145, 211 (1910). See also note by
Hauriou in S.1908,3,17. See generally 2 DEMOGUE, TRAIT[) DES OBLIGATIONS EN
GANARAL 311 (1923).
258. 2 DEMOGUE, TaArrt DES OBLIGATIONS EN Gj2N2RAL 312-313 (1923).
259. Id. at 313. Cf. 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAITf] PRATIQUE DE DRorr CIVIw
FRANgAIS-OBLIOATIONS-PART I 140 (2d ed. Esmein 1952).
260. 2 DEMoGoUE, TRAIT1 DES OBLIGATIONS EN G2N9RAL 318-19 (1923).
261. Id. at 317, 318, 321.
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(d) A court may always declare invalid any stipulation
deemed uriconscionable.262
At common law, where the expression "contracts of adhe-
sion" is not very successful,263 the problem of standard form
contracts, sometimes containing fine print clauses, has been dis-
cussed, primarily, in connection with clauses establishing a
limitation of liability.26 4 In some cases, it has been decided that
the offeree is bound to all the terms, provided a reasonable man
in his position would have understood that a contract was being
proposed.2 5 In this approach, no inquiry is made to determine
whether the offeree incurred negligence for not having read and
understood the terms in fine print.2 6 In other cases, the sub-
jective theory of contract formation prevails, and, on this basis,
no validity is given to the fine print clause, unless evidence is
furnished that the offeree's attention was called to it by the
offeror, or he otherwise had knowledge of it. 267 In a third line
of cases, the decisions consider the offeree bound by the fine
print "where a reasonable man would have understood both
that a contract was being proposed and that the clause in issue
262. Civ., Jan. 4, 1910, S.1911,1,521, D.1911,I,104; cf. Trib. Comm. Seine,
Dec. 3, 1919, GAz PAL., 1920,1,316. Compare with UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE§ 2-302 (1962).
For a discussion of contrat-type, more recent than contrat d'adhdsion,
and almost Identical with the Anglo-American notion of standard form
contract, see 2 CARBONNIR, DROIT CiVIL 342-43 (1957). See also Laut, Les
Contrats-Types, Rsvun TRIMESTRIELLE 129 (1953). These contrats-types, in
essence, show the same structure as a contract of adhesion, but instead of
being drafted for the operation of an isolated concern, the contrat-type is
drafted by a professional association, such as the standard bill of lading,
established by the Central Committee of French Maritime Carriers. Although
the activity for which these contrats-types are designed is not regulated by
public act, they should be interpreted in the same way as contrats d'adhdsion.
263. But see Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About
Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943), and Ehrenzweig, Ad-
hesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 1072 (1953). See
also Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960),
where both articles are cited.
264. Cf. The Kensington, 183 U.S. 263, 46 L.Ed. 190, 22 Sup.Ct. 102 (1902).
See generally 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 90B (1957); Note, Contract Clauses
in Fine Print, 63 HARv. L. REV. 494 (1950).
265. Yerza, Andrews & Thurston v. Randazzo Macaroni Mfg. Co., 315
Mo. 927, 288 S.W. 20 (1926); Secoulsky v. Oceanic Steam Nay. Co., 223 Mass.
465, 112 N.E. 151 (1916); Taussig v. Bode & Haslett, 134 Cal. 260, 66 Pao.
259 (1901).
266. See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 70 (1932): "One who makes a written
offer which is accepted, or who manifests acceptance of the terms of a
writing which he should reasonably understand to be an offer or proposed
contract, is bound by the contract, though ignorant of the terms of the
writing or of its proper interpretation."
267. See Reynolds v. Binding-Stevens Seed Co., 179 Okla. 628, 67 P.2d
440 (1937); May Hosiery Mills v. Hall & Son, 77 Cal.App. 291, 295, 246 Pac.
332, 333 (1916).
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was part of that proposed contract, but do not otherwise inquire
whether it would have been reasonable to read and understand
the terms. '268 In a particular jurisdiction, the approach may
vary according to the subject matter of the contracts and the
business circumstances of the case.
In certain areas, however, such as passenger baggage, the
existence of federal legislation governing limitation of liability 269
now allows the framing of this question within an institutional
approach close to the continental view, as the validity of a clause
limiting the carrier's liability is subject to control by a public
agency, and the passenger must be given notice of the carrier's
liability limitation.2 7 0
In other instances, the nature of a document where a cer-
tain stipulation is contained will have a very definite impact
on the binding force of the stipulation. Thus, in everyday trans-
actions imposed by the necessities of modern life, such as leaving
a vehicle in a parking lot, a person will be given a cardboard
tag. The question is then presented whether the tag amounts to
a contract the terms of which are binding. It has been decided
that if such a document can be taken by the party receiving it
as a simple means of identification of an object, then it is not a
contract, and the stipulations therein contained are therefore
not binding.271 This is the approach that Louisiana courts have
consistently followed.272 Although no code authority is invoked
268. Note, Contract Clauses in Fine Print, 63 HARV. L. REV. 494, 496
(1950). See Boston Lumber Co. v. Pendleton Bros., Inc., 102 Conn. 626, 129
A. 782 (1925); Roe v. R. A. Naylor, Ltd., 1 K.B. 712 (1917); The Majestic, 166
U.S. 375 (1897). See generally 1 WuSTON, CONTRACTS § 90C (1957) for a dis-
cussion of the doctrine of constructive knowledge of offer applied to docu-
ments.
269. 49 U.S.C. § 20 (1946), Carmack amendment to the Interstate Com-
merce Act. See generally Comment, Limitations o Liability: Passenger In-
juries and Baggage Losses on Land, Sea and Air, 34 TUL. L. REv. 354 (1960).
270. Tennesse Coach Co. v. Carter, 27 Tenn.App. 479, 182 S.W.2d 121
(1943); Western Assur. Co. v. Wells Fargo & Co., 143 Minn. 60, 173 N.W. 402
(1919). See generally Comment, 34 TUL. L. REv. 354, 356 (1960).
271. See 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 90A, at 292-293 (1957): "The acceptance
of a paper which purports to be a contract sufficiently Indicates an assent to
Its terms whatever they may be, and it is immaterial that they are, in fact,
unknown." (Emphasis added.) See also id. § 90B, at 299: "Whether the same
principle is applicable to a ticket, depends essentially upon the question
whether the ticket is a mere check showing the points between which the
passenger is entitled to be carried, and does not purport to be a contract
stating the rights of the parties. If such is the interpretation given the
ticket, the passenger would not be required at his peril to read any stipu-
lations upon it."
272. See Lawes v. New Orleans Transfer Co., 123 So. 144 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1929): which held that when a person delivers baggage to a local transfer
company, and receives a paper which from the circumstances appears to be
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in the decisions supporting this view, an answer to this ques-
tion is clearly found in Article 1766 and 1811 of the Louisiana
Civil Code. Consent may be express of implied, but in either
case knowledge of what is being consented to is required from
the consenting party. If such knowledge is not brought home
to one of the parties, the other cannot avail himself of a stipu-
lation, very especially if the clause is in derogation of the sup-
pletive law.
a receipt to enable the person to identify the property, and no notice is given
showing that it embodies special contract, no contract arises as matter of
law from the acceptance and receipt. Marine Ins. Co., Ltd., of London, Eng-
land v. Rehm, 177 So. 79 (La. App. Or!. Cir. 1937). See generally Note,
Effectiveness of Limitation of Liability Printed on Claim Check, 12 TuL. L.
REv. 458 (1938). See also Levy v. Kerwin, 6 Orl. App. 93 (1927).
Where a landlord introduced a clause in a rent receipt releasing him
from liability, the court said that there is a distinction between rent receipts,
commonly used in commercial transactions, and contracts between parties, in
that the receipt permits of no negotation or discussion, being simply a ful-
fillment of one's assumed obligations, while a contract or agreement between
parties is a matter of discussion and arrangement, with full opportunity
for deliberate reciprocal action. Roppolo v. Pick, 4 So.2d 839 (La. App. OrL
Cir. 1941).
